Illusion of the End – Baudrillard

Are we approaching a time of vanishing history?  Three views or hypotheses may be advanced.  One hypothesis centers upon the acceleration of modernity to a point of (like a spacecraft) escape velocity.  At this point, the realm of reality and history is left behind.  A second hypothesis opposes hypothesis one.  In this situation, history vanishes as processes slow down.  Both of these hypotheses originate in physics.  In number one, the velocity needed to separate from the mass accelerates to the necessary point of departure.  Degrees of slowness, distance, and liberation crystallize to create history.  As with gravity and objects which are held in place, in this new world individuals are released to each one’s trajectory and meaning.  People are hence, “lost in space” (2).  Meaning in history and life is lost in hyperspace and simulation.  In the second hypothesis the mass increases in density to a point (critical mass) in which history is unable to reach its escape velocity.  Deceleration of life exchanges are affected by hyperdensity in city life, commodities and messages.  In this state new events continually cancel out previous events.  Life becomes imploded and meaningless (3).  In each instance, whether hypothesis one or two there is no point of return.  In the third hypothesis, music is used to analogize the point of disappearance or a vanishing point.  Music becomes so “perfected” in attempt to reproduce it, so amplified and subjected to technological tweaking (my word) that it becomes something other than music.  If it reaches this point of “ultimate perfection”, it is only an illusion or a simulation (5).  He says that disappearance of history is like the point of no return.  Baudrillard quotes Elian Canetti at page 6,

“beyond this point, nothing is true.  It is for this reason that the petite musique of history…vanishes into the microscopics or the stereophonics of news.”

Identifying the vanishing point is critical.  Media and news as with music become a simulation “we will never again know what the social or music were before being exacerbated into their present useless perfection.”  While leaving history the social enters into a realm of simulation.  This is not new; history has always been subjected to some simulation.  Rather the new simulation is much more hyper or accelerated and more artificial than in the past.

            Are we moving linearly to a point of no return?  At this point Baudrillard seems to connect the concept of “accomplished” linear production of history to religions calling for a final judgment and last call or final goal of society (7).  He discusses the historical perspective of salvation and need or destiny to hasten the end (millenarian concepts).  Early Christians tried to hasten the imminent end through their own acts.  Similarly, terrorism may find explanations in “effort to conjure up, in its own way, the end of history”.  Similarly, as humans are “obsessed with” time and concepts of “real time” there is now the ability for instant news.  This obsession of real time cancels out delay, time flows, place of the event and frees humans of “linear time”.  News is delivered almost before it occurs.  However, in consideration of reality and real time, “real time” is even more artificial than a simple recording (9).  It is almost a “denial of time”, it becomes an immediate enjoyment of an event that has no meaning or purpose.  These events lead society to be apprehensive of the future, especially the coming year 2000. 

            This leads to questioning whether history and movement toward a new modernity may be reversed.  In the 1980s, history took a turn and began to reverse.  This coincides with the coming end of the short 20^th century which Habermas writes about that ended with the Cold War.  In Euclidean history, such as in past modernity, progress and democracy were linear and moved from point A to point B in a straight line.  Now in this phase of history there emerges a non-Euclidean history that is a curvature as the curve of a sphere or the earth.  In other words, at points in time society may visualize change that is coming, but not fully see it.  This point of curvature is turbulent like waters that begin to run more rapid and turbulent as they near the coming waterfall (11).  Visualizing history as a sphere means that there is no end to history; rather it replays itself from period to period.  Just like the old tape player, this allows a rewinding of the melody for replay.  However, unlike the tape which plays the same the new play may allow for changes that may provide a method to avoid the “bankruptcy” experienced in the past history (12).  It is no longer work that serves the reproduction of capital, but capital that produces work (16).

            To take action that causes something not to take place is called “deterrence”.  Deterrence dominates our lives today.  It changes the events of life whether in war, history, reality, or even passion.  (Writer’s comment: Seemingly, this leads to changes in institutional structures such as government, and family.  An example might be online marriage formation.)  Baudrillard concludes at page 17 this process leads to a reversal of history that can destabilize individual memory, prediction, and destroy credibility.  All of this leads to an obstruction of the linear view where curvature leads to deprivation of true meanings.  Hence, society is left in a void, a “black hole”.  This is perhaps not as that of Dante, but still a void or at loss.  Baudrillard is quoted at page 20,

“…this parabolic curvature of historical space.  For the past can only be represented and reflected if it pushes us in the other direction, toward a future of some kind.  Retrospection is dependent on a proposition which enables us to refer to something as past and gone, and thus as having really taken place.  If, by some strange revolution, we set off in the opposite direction…of the past, then we can no longer represent that something to ourselves.”

            Memory and continuity are lost in artificiality.  Events no longer have an “aura” that reveals a “glory of the event”.  Both passion over and compassion for events are no longer central in life (21).  In short, glory has been revised into or made into an illusion.  Rather, events become created center stage performance in “real time”.  Historical and political reason vanishes as events become managed and enable the promoting a way to forget the past (23).  Media and advertising are instrumental in this process of forgetting through promotion of ideas and myths.  These myths help absolve society of its past history and events.  For example, the French Revolution once stood for freedom, but is becoming something to be avoided.  The West has forgotten and distanced itself from the democratic principles while the East has with collapse of the USSR lead to an awakening of democracy (28).  History becomes recycled so that it “fits” the postmodern and serves intellectual comfort (24).  Through this process, society becomes both repentant of the past and resentful of the past.  This resentment is played against past events such as the French Revolution, the Rights of Man, and even in Art which allow for the disillusion of things (25).  Waste or excrement of society and events of the past accumulate as in a dustbin.  History is like a dustbin holding within it the past events of social times.  Like waste, history is capable of being recycled. 

            Satirically, it may be stated, “Hooray” the end of the century is at hand and “history continues to exist” (28).  History does not end, but it is continually revised and renewed.  An example is the renewal and search for freedom in Eastern Europe.  After the fall of the USSR, fresh hopes for and revival in search for freedom is accompanied by all the historical challenges.  Paradoxically, the West where freedom has been idealized, in Baudrillard’s words “has died a natural death” (29).   As the East has “unfrozen” freedom, the fluidity of the West has created complexity in freedom.  As the East resuscitates freedom rehabilitation takes place.  What transpires is not an East and West with the same beliefs and values, but rather a continuation of two separate circulations (29).  As the East changes toward freedom, the West, (the wellspring of freedom having run dry) moves away from its past (31).  Quoting Baudrillard at page 31,

“we see re-emerging here all that we are,…in a kind of ideal hallucination and return of the repressed, including the worst, corniest, most banal things in Western ‘culture’ – no boundaries.  It is, then a moment of truth for that culture, as…with the primitive cultures.”

The point is that the West awoke democracy and freedom and now puts it to sleep while the East, which put democracy and freedom to death, has now resuscitated it.  Is it the West that will next resuscitate Stalinism?  Societies learn and forget only to re-experience the forgotten in a new form (32).  He goes on to give examples of the reunion of East and West Germany, restoration of the Holy Roman Empire, forgetting about Hitler, WWII and the Cold War.

            Modernity was linked to “self-criticism” while postmodernity is linked to “repentance” Modernity led to excess in many different forms; Stalinism serves as an example of an excessive type.  Repentance leads to recycling of past forms (35).  Broad categories of excess associated with modernity include ideology, free market, profits and utopia.  The postmodernity is characterized by the unreal, the speculative, lack of production and profit.  As post USSR Eastern Europe emerges into the economy of capitalism it will move directly into the postmodern character.  Concepts about human rights and democracy will be based upon what have become western illusions of these concepts (36).  When the USSR imploded, it immediately began to grasp for democracy and liberation, what was at its disposal was the illusion of these as constructed in the West (37).  Baudrillard questions the type of exchange that will take place as the West and the East enter a transfusion like relationship in postmodernity (42).  What will the West take from the East and the East take from the West?  He seems to foresee more woe for the West in taking from the East than vice versa.  Different compulsions, objects, images, media and communication are some concerns (38).  He asks, does stability in the East lead to instability in the West?  Examples are Chernobyl incidents, depression, war, poverty.  Perhaps the irony is that the almost “witty rejoicing” comes with inversion of the East and West.  Recall sudden changes that occur, such as the implosion of the USSR (39).  He states that “evil” has been liberated from the East and now is present.  It is fluid, liquid, and transparent in form, not of the opaque type with substance that could be identified more easily.  Rather this is without substance and therefore illusory.  It may take form in terrorism, politics, biology, sexual connotations or other forms (40-1).  The hazard that accompanies this phenomenon is like the story of the lorry and the hole, one good bounce and the hole will fall from the lorry and the lorry fall in it (42).  Like blood, this transfusion between East and West may become a contaminate for the one giving blood (43).  While communism was contained, it was integral and was a known factor with a known place.  As it disintegrated, it became capable of spreading (44).  Like the broken mirror it is likened to a hologram that recreates itself in mini but complete versions in the form of arms sales, nuclear fallout and the like (50).  Consequences of this immediate self-destruction of the USSR are incalculable (45).  Many mini-empires may be the coming result of the “collapse of the great empire” (50).  Ironically, the collapse turns Marx on his head as capitalism survives (51).  Perhaps capitalism will still lead to the real communism.  

            Media is a powerful force that portrays what will be history.  News and media make the incredible and uncertain both credible and certain, at least in a virtual sense.  Images and history therefore are manipulated by news polls and become virtuality via the television.  Examples include the filming and faking of the dead in Romania and the Gulf War.  TV mystifies the viewer and blackmails through violence and death.  In the past, the “fake” was called either play or romance.  Today fake is virtual via the “digital” transmission and the television.  Virtuality becomes real without question.  Information managed in this form may become catastrophic (56).  The television provides a strategic and empty space of representation into which society is both politically and socially pulled.  Pressures exerted call for responses in the form of image-function, blackmail-function, and deterrence-function which society readily swallows as if an aphrodisiac (57).

            Much of this manipulation is not viciously directed; rather the desire is to add credibility to the information and events covered by media.  In other words, the manipulation is only meant to bolster the truth.  Unfortunately, this often backfires and leads to decredibilization which leads to “invalidation of facts” and distortion of history (58).  As a result, the horizon of the sphere of history often harbors less meaning for society.  Society has become demystified (60).

            The illusions of life today may be reflected in the Gulf War, which was a simulation of “an instantaneous atomic war without the atom” (62).  In this war, the media was directly involved in promoting public opinion.  Just as the technologies of the military and soldiers were instrumental in the war, the media also fought it worldwide by shaping opinion through the shaped battlefield of the mind and conscious.  Nevertheless, why was it actually fought?  Troy had its Helen (65).  What was the Gulf War’s Helen, its simulacrum?  What did the illusion cover up?        

            Much of today’s agenda is to manage coming events and catastrophe.  Much of this catastrophe arises in the exploitation of the East by the West or the North exploiting the labor and raw goods of the South.  As quoted on page 67, “We are consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it.”

            This effort though is only a ruse to manage production and create conditions for reproduction in a market that is headed for catastrophe.  What will happen when the “Great Crash” actually can no longer be headed off through catastrophe management (67, 69)?  Marxist drive for profits exemplifies the extreme poverty reproduced as only a symbol that fuels the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.  We thrive on this capability.  Much of the world’s poverty is a result of Western power to profit (67).  The West feeds itself on exploitation, just as an addict feeds on drugs “Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by news media, our humanitarian aid” (68).  This is likened to economic aid that serves to strengthen the exploited sufficiently to allow them to survive so they may be exploited for a longer duration.  In essence, this is reduced to managed exploitation.  It is like exploitation of banana groves, coffee beans and the like.  These foreign exploits are managed through management of catastrophes on foreign shores that keep the West involved in the regions being exploited.  When catastrophe is waning, it must be artificially produced so exploitation may continue (68).  Artificial catastrophe may be manufactured.  This form is imminent and foreseeable.  It is pre-programmed catastrophe.  This is truly managed catastrophe.  We are presently at this age.  What comes next is less predictable or perhaps will be unpredictable.  It is deliberate and experimental catastrophe (71).  What will happen if the foreign catastrophe is limited and the catastrophe is produced at home?  What happens when the “Great Crash” comes?  Human search for certainty and control will lead to uncertain destiny (71).

            In our search for future structure, humans have created an artificial form of fossil or relic.  We “fetishize” fossils and relics.  They allow us to “hallucinate” about our origins (75).  When we locate them, we put them away in storage and create an artificial copy as a substitute.  This creation is similar and artificial; a simulacra.  Ironically, the substitute copy decays and disappears more quickly than the original artifact (75).  This is a backward motion.  As with the introduction of the reversal of history, this is a reversal also.  It is like a tadpole that in its forward morphemic maturity it suffers an involution to an earlier form in sexual reproduction (76).  What might this foreshadow about cloning of humans and the conventional role of sex throughout history?

            This culminates in example of waste.  Like ecology, society is also a residue.  Much of the things humans create quickly become waste just like the simulacra.  As this occurs the world itself becomes waste or at least a waste bin.  This is similar to the dustbins of history, which held transformed illusions, and virtual images of the present (79).  Waste of the past was in the form of ruins and artifacts.  Waste of the present is residue of overproduction and construction which translate to “waste from the out-set”, or waste produced “as waste” in the form of missiles and break neck investments (79).  The same goes for people.  An example may be the “boat people” or perhaps the “homeless war vet” or even “convicts” if we consider management of labor.  These become the “liberated unfortunate” (80).  When things begin to disappear, society begins to speak of “rights” and balance (80-2).  In addressing these matters, humans begin to experiment.  Just as humankind has experimented with nature, ecology and animals, it also experiments on itself.  This self-experimentation leads to self-destruction, like the vision of the “human guinea pig”.  This perpetuates a “death drive” that is played out as a “sacrifice of the species” by experiment (83, 84).  In so doing, humankind seeks a simulation of itself and to exceed the expectation of “natural selection”.  No other specie does this.  This arrogance will lead to change in, and perhaps disappearance of humans in natural form if not completely (84).  This is a self-serving biogenetic evolution that will result in the same type of involution that was experienced by the USSR, a reversal effect (84, 85).  An example of the type of managed self-experiment is the Biosphere 2 project.  False experimentation is like false imagery.  Similarly, Biosphere 2 is likened to the illusion and artificiality of Disneyland (87).  Ironically, humankind’s attempts to achieve survival through artificial means and experimentation, the seeking of an artificial paradise, are the road to disappearance.  As life sustained on a “drip-feed” is in actuality not life, but rather a prolonged, sustained state of death (88). 

            In past ages, humans considered themselves immortal when they were not.  Now humans do not believe they are immortal, but without knowing so, without wishing for it, and without believing it humans are becoming immortal (99).  This is a worse fate than death.  In the past death meant recollection, memory, celebration, ritual, or even distinction.  Some even sought death as a means of immortality.  Experimentation and technology has led to “clonal and metastatic” de facto eternity previously associated with inhuman characteristics (99).

          Experiments such as Biosphere 2 are holdover of the Middle Age search for immortality and resurrection.  Success in these endeavors lead to resuscitation.  Nevertheless, with resuscitation come all the old desire, want, fear, neurosis, virus, and handicap experienced before.  Today the search is realized in Biosphere 2.  Biosphere 2 promises a new life that is expurgated, disinfected, immunized immortalized, transparent, in short a prophylaxis and realization of paradise on earth (89).  This process leads to “immortality of the species in real time”.  This is not an immortality of the soul, but of the physical to be able to continue reproducing itself.  Humans want a millenarian paradise on earth and immediately.  This is a place of no death, no end, just a perpetual renewal of life (90).  This is not to say there is no individual death, but no death of humankind.  In this pursuit, science has changed its focus upon the end to a focus upon the beginning “the illusion of the end has been supplanted by the illusion of the cause. (90)” 

            Unbelief and belief both focus upon the “subject” believer (93).  Belief need not exist if the “object” truly exists.  Credibility on the other hand arises from the “object”.  Belief is image of the relation of subject to object.  Credibility is relation between object and code.  Credibility coincides with the concept of immortality.  In the past, it was belief, and the connection it had with the subject that directed human existence.  Today in light of Biosphere 2 type experimentation, immortality becomes a credible “biologic process of code”.  Immortality can no longer be subjected to philosophical criticism once it becomes credible.  In other words, “perpetuation and realization” (Nietzsche’s principles) of “a humanity searching for its own condition, humanity, and capacities” has come to be tested.  The “veils of the human condition” have been lifted.  Ironically, Nietzsche falls short in his theory.  Rather the world falls short and folds in on itself and the result is “a transfiguration of the human race into the ‘subhuman’ and disappearance of human species characteristics (94, 95).  An irruption of the human into the inhuman occurs, such as the “sexed into the unsexed” whereby a reduction takes place and humans are reduced to the lowest common denominator (96).  For instance, the Enlightenment arose upon consideration of ‘man’s qualities’, virtues, natural gifts, the right of freedom and its exercise.  Humanism today places its concern on the “immortality” of the individual and the species.  Therefore, the current focus places the experiment for immortality before the importance of the individual subject (human kind) to enjoy freedom and purpose of life.  An example is that the genome takes center stage to overall humanity.  If genetics and biology are central to humanity then humans may as well begin calling themselves “apes” or “mice” since genetic similarity is approximate.  Rather, Baudrillard argues it is humanity, freedom, transcendence, and purpose that should be center stage (97).  Will the current experiment in immortality lead to “no soul, no conscious, and no unconscious?

            Immortality relates to need for “identity”, completion, saturation, repletion, and perfection (101).  Immortality and continuation relates to resources available for disposal.  To call upon “all resources” is to recognize that there is no longer anything left at command.  It is like losing one’s shadow.  It is like using the last bullet or the last tool in the toolbox.  What is left?  Resources that remain, yet to be called upon are reserves and are similarly like a shadow the “last vestige” not yet fully seen or known but still existing and comforting.  Today’s humanity is called upon to use all resources at its disposal.  In all walks of life and as perhaps accelerated by digital capacities there is an exhaustion of the tape, which must simply be rewound and played again.  Even so, humans use only about one-third of the genes in the body.  Two-thirds of the genes are dormant and like reserves lay in wait, like fallow ground.  Is this waste, or comforting reserve, like the shadow?  If a reserve, then it is like language that is the use of image to signify (102).  On the other hand, digital capacities and computers call for the maximized use of signs and digital language.  Does this create a mystification of the horizon of the sphere?  This may be likened to history, which has used all its resources.  It must only reverse itself and repeat itself, looking for change and alternatives.  (Writer comment: Does Disneyworld or the marketing of the previous Red Army provide an illusion by which society may reevaluate the history of humanity and adjust a new beginning?)  As with history, if the social approaches this horizon and has used all its resources must it too rewind, reverse and replay?  The irony of this search for resources is much like the vivid portrait Baudrillard takes from Cannetti as he contrasts and compares the “rising sun” in all of its full brightness and glory as depicted in the Japanese flag as against the “rising mushroom” in all its full brightness and glory and destruction and later dismal darkness and fall-out as it rises and then descends upon Hiroshima.  Humanity needs an umbrella, a safety device that is ready and in reserve, a small tool kit to retrieve just in case it needs it in an emergency.  Humanity needs a point of last resort.  When the last tool is used, the truth about human substance is realized.  Humanity like climbing Annapurna ends.  There remains nothing left to jump over, not even one’s own shadow (105).  Humanity has become transparent and therefore has no shadow left.

            Post-modern individualism evokes liberalization (107).  Liberty and liberation are distinct.  Liberty is limited and transcendent in symbolic space of the subject who is confronted with destiny.  Liberation is in potentially unlimited space, pushing everything including individuals forward to the limit of potential, to the breaking point and inability to respond.  The liberal individual is not equated to the free subject.  The opposition of liberty and liberation is found in liberalization, which dilutes liberty.  Alienation disappears because all are self-identical.  Each no longer differs from him/her self (108).  This indifference may be expressed in time, space, politics, and sexually.  Absence of division leads to suppression of otherness.  What once was otherness and difference becomes “same” and “indifference”.  Boredom results and leads to what Baudrillard calls “identity syndrome” in which humans crave “otherness” (109).  Like Frankenstein who craved a mate of his own kind yet there was none, this becomes a maddening search.

            What comes after the end?  Non-linear, non-Euclidian space tends to hide the end (110).  Cause and effect are distorted in this scenario and lead to mystery, disorder, or chaotic order.  Exponentially either instability or stability may occur.  Baudrillard says both occur (112).  Exponential instability leads to uncontrollable effects and end.  Exponential stability leads to the point of beginning.  Baudrillard claims society has already entered the retroactive stage of history (115).  The “Big Crumb” he claims is what approaches, not an end but a reversal and reforming.  Metastasis resurfaces history and attempts to give it a new face in an attempt to rehabilitate the past.  Disneyworld is a precursor to this attempt to restructure using its illusion of future world, gothic villages, and magical country life (118).  Disneyworld is only one example of paving the way to the future; others include the Gulf War and the end of the USSR as sources for points of beginning.  Alas, the end circles about us as a satellite.  Like the “empty space of news” it is about us history like information circles about society looking for a place to land and identify, yet unable.  What is left of the dream for a real utopia has been subsumed and covered in illusion and fiction.       

                                                    Reference

Baudrillard, Jean. 1995 [1992]. The Illusion of the End. Translated by Chris Turner (1994).  Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Anatomy of Revolution Part 2

For a time the moderates enjoy management of governmental affairs and attempt sometimes to modify, adjust or adapt the needs of the revolution to the legal governmental organizational structure.  For a period, sometimes longer, sometimes shorter they tend to have the upper hand in making decisions and maintaining a degree of legitimacy under the auspice of the former governmental system and structure (160).  This phase, whatever the duration is honeymoon-like.  In keeping with Brinton, this is still part of the First Stage of revolution.  A distinctive occurrence is the transition of the moderate control to the extremist control and potential for terror and/or other crisis to arise.  Chapter Six examines the ascension of the extremist faction to power and describes certain uniformities that Brinton finds for the revolutions he examines.  As noted in an earlier essay, these are the English, French, Russian and American revolutions.  As such they are a narrowly defined in relation to social political needs and all are revolutions that occur prior to the mid-twentieth century, and this time frame is perhaps only relevant because the Russian Revolution may  have finally ended in the late 1940’s. 

Extremist Ascension

In tracking patterns of ascension from moderate control to left wing control by extremists, it is worth considering several things.  First, the extremist camp tends to be small in number (150).  Large masses do not a revolution make.  Many may come in and join on the heels of the few (154).  However, in what they lack in numbers they make up in cohesiveness.  This may be explained in consciousness and pride that reflects their ability to achieve the goal of a cause.  This conscious may be even more critical to the ascension process when it is further considered that as time passes some extremists will drop out.  With the winding down of the First Stage some more mundane affairs of running and organizing the government may cause some of the less intellectual, more physical types to simply return to their previous concerns and allow the remaining extremists to dicker with and pressure the moderates in transforming government (154).  Second, not only does consciousness create adhesive unity, but feeds as fanatic devotion.  This is still a time of vigor and some of the initial slogans of freedom and democracy are still being quoted.  This spirit of the First Step has not cooled and organized to the point that factions within the extremist ranks can begin to see different avenues of development.  At this point, it is “all extremists” vis “all moderates”.  Perhaps the moderates, partly because they seem to lend some legitimacy to the Old Regime government form, become the new opponent for the extremists.  However, this is a different opposition than that which led to the First Step against the Old Regime.  This step moves in time at its own sure, steady but not overbearing pace.   A third observation is that the extremists are very disciplined (155).  These people largely are used to waiting, following, and doing obeisance to the ranks.  Their past is steeped in historic oppression.  An excellent use for this pliancy is to establish and fill the ranks of a new model army for the new government.  This of course becomes a major power element for the extremists.  Fourth, there is within the extremist ranks a devotion to the leaders.  Unity in leadership follows.  As noted above, there will be perhaps a time later after the moderates are displaced that some factions of leadership may erupt, but now is not the stage, not if the revolution is to follow Brinton’s uniformities.  Command is best at the top and affective because of makeup.  Within the extremist at this level, there must be a desire that comes from high ideals, and complete contempt for anything that inhibits the establishment and realization of those ideals.  There is realism in the practicality of achieving the goals and there is a desire “prophet’s fire” to inspire self and others to reach for it.  Brinton uses Lenin’s speech to the Bolshevik party just before the October Revolution (158).  These are men or people of action.  The quote at page 159 is apropos to an understanding of this “only a sincere extremist in a revolution can kill men because he loves man.”  In other words, there is a chore to be done and the expedient route is the correct choice (160).

DESCRIBING ACCESSION

This is not a sudden shift or transition from the moderate to extremist control.  Much like the old Dynaflo transmission used by Buick in the 1950’s which used a clutch for reverse and forward and high.  Through use of the clutch, there is a significant point of change in direction, flow and speed.  For a time the movement is slow and constant with no sharp distinctions, then comes a smoother than the first shirt, but still a noticeable shift into high.  The moderates can almost be called perhaps in the minds of the moderates as a reverse or at least neutral setting.  The shift from this state to low requires multiple things to occur such as the right amount of clutch, gasoline and timing.  Then the stage of the extremist may take hold of the engine.  If the clutch is slow or fast, gas is too rich or too lean, or the driver’s time out of pace the auto lurches, dies or moves full speed ahead.  This seems to give a picture of the dimensions of revolution at different stages.  It seems to work well here at this stage.  As with the clutch and accelerator, extremists keep pressure on the moderates (161).  Eventually, with timing and acceleration, and adjustment out on the clutch the new organization can take hold and move past the first stages of revolution. 

            Brinton notes on page 163, that the extremists at this level of pressure on the moderates are not ignorant of political matters and some may be well experienced.  Here again is the notion that the general masses are not as critical at this stage.  Actual overthrow of the moderates he says is usually a “neat” affair free of great popular uprising.  Maneuvers include use of printed agitation, police power, military, telegraph, post, ministries.  What about digital methods that may be in use today? 

            Once the shift occurs, the focus is off the past Old Regime and the obstacles called moderates.  Now individual factions may arise.  In order to survive, what has been grounded in the most democratic theme in the past is replaced by show of power and strict behavior (166).  This may be described as dictatorship used to maintain the uniformity of the revolution.  The example of the Rump Parliament strict sanctions on the press is demonstrative of this concept (165).  As Brinton points out there is a distinction in the American case.  But in the other three there is a concept of the revolutionary dictatorship which means that in order to salvage the revolution even one for democracy and equality there may be a time of crisis where there must be a distinction among people “who deserve it, and for those who don’t.”  The reference to Marx on page 167 is central to explaining this conclusion.  Hence, dissention that arises within is quickly dealt with.  The same type of dissention if it had reared its head when facing the moderates would have been detrimental.  Now, print can be quashed, and trouble makers dealt with quickly by expulsion or “judicial murder”.  Danton and Hebert are excellent examples of judicial murder under the tutelage of Robespierre.  Smaller, and various trouble making groups can be disposed of more easily than disputes with leaders.  These smaller groups are more so rabble and fringe groups.

            In this dictatorship period, power is centralized by force, as Brinton says “rough and ready centralization”.  Final decisions are concentrated at the top by a few persons of national recognition in the form of an executive committee.  Sometimes the administrators are inexperienced, but under pressure to get the job done they perform their job without question.  An effective and swift acting bureaucracy is formed to carry our orders and dictates.  Courts are, if necessary, reorganized by supplementation with special courts, and tribunals.  To carry out the levels of judicial and legislative law a revolutionary police force comes to life.  With this shift, the time for addressing internal and external issues such as civil and foreign war is at hand.  Not only must internal dissention be resolved, but also the new government must prove itself and seek legitimacy in its neighbors, both former enemies and allies.

NEW CONTROL

With accession of the extremists a time of organization may bring a time of peace for the nation, but behind the scenes the extremists are organizing their best politically trained and attempting to shore up governmental machinery.  To the onlooker it may appear the time of conflict is now over, rather there is a new stage of struggle in which individual leaders may grapple for control and meanwhile establish a firm grip on the national bureaucracy, the nations people and establish its credibility with the world. This new stage is the Crisis Stage.  It is characterized by radical control and strong enforcement of central power.  This struggle affects both the masses (the outsiders) and the insiders (177).  The outsiders seem to generally accept what the leaders do and follow them, however this soon turns to strain and stress under the order of the day, which is organize and ingrain the new society.

            In creating an atmosphere that is almost religious in effect, the new regime must create identity.  Several schemes lead to renaming of places, people and things (179).  How does changing of names affect outsiders?  A quote on page 180 is “Change a name and you change the thing.”  Part of the reason for this is to uproot all vestiges of the past old regime.  Potentially to disrupt the past serves to disorient the populous and somehow allow time for the new regime to establish itself.  After all, there will be some leaders who seek to control others and this needs to be resolved “out of the public eye”.  However, in short all people including outsiders must participate in the new regime.  One way is to give all past associated people, places and things a new identity that expresses the victory and optimism of the revolution.  Hence, we see the naming of “Constitution Avenue”.    Part of this arises in the sense of the revolution which Brinton calls puritanical and idealistic tendencies.  These tendencies religiously seek to eradicate minor vices. Eventually as time passes and radical pressure to conform increases, even the common enjoyment and simple pleasures of life otherwise considered legitimate pastimes may be outlawed.  The outsiders become increasingly frustrated and strained.  This ultimately grows until any change in the extremist terror is welcomed by the masses.

            Insiders during the revolution are affected differently.  Many may drop out due to the endless disputes, committees, and tribunals of this curvilinear organizational process of the new regime.  However, not all drop out; some remain entranced by the religious psychological state.  This stage of the revolution only serves to invigorate them to work very hard seeking ideal patterns of life, not in the future but now, in the present, on this earth (186).  This may be referred to as a phase of active religion (191).  These no doubt are many of those that benefit from the phenomena of economic struggle that takes shape.  This takes the form of confiscation and redistribution of money and land.  Brinton finds this takes place in all four of the revolutions examined (184).  This started with confiscation of the property of the old regime but as competing extremist leaders and moderate groups are eliminated, their property is also redistributed.

1. Hence, some are under stimulated and some are over stimulated.  People can only stretch so far and must give to “reaction”.   

 

SUMMARY UNIFORMITIES OF TERROR AND VIRTUE STAGE

1. renaming places, people, things (179).
2. economic class struggle (184).
3. as forms of religion they share universalist aspirations and nationalism (192).
4. religion is lent to secularism and anti-organized traditionalism (196).

 

Once the extremists have more or less united under a singular leader the stage of terror and virtue accelerates.  The strain on the masses and some insiders builds.  Ultimately, the stage of terror and virtue begins to evolve back toward a more moderate form of government.  Before this can occur, there must be a change in the leadership again.  In France, the guillotine for Robespierre paved the way for Napoleon’s leadership.  This new stage is Thermidor.  The Thermidorian Reaction winds down the revolution.  In the case of England and France, the revolution wound down more quickly.  In Russia, it was very slow as noted in the text of Chapter Eight and in the Preface to the Vintage Edition (225).  In America Thermidor was even still more different from France and England (206).

            Several uniformities are found in Thermidor.  There is a restoration of the normal.  Normality does not mean peace and happiness; there will still be necessary terrorisms as the leadership becomes established.  However, characteristic in varying ways are the following: First, extreme and isolated economic hardship on the poorer classes and excessive pleasure of the upper class as a system of stratification reestablishes itself (212); Second, a move from secular humanistic religion back to the organized church, though this is more one of toleration in the Russian model due to perhaps the strength of Marxism as a religion (also the American situation is distinguished) (214); Third, a return of pleasure in daily life.  This “return” is in light of the recent past experience, almost hedonistic (218).  Last, there is a return of, or as Brinton refers to the phenomena, an “amnesty” of those previously expelled.  These individuals become either part of the political scheme or return to a solitary life.

            A strong dictatorial leader characterizes this phase.  Brinton states at page 208: “After a revolution has undergone the crisis and the accompanying centralization of power, some strong leader must handle that centralized power when the mad religious energy of the crisis period has burned itself out”.  It seems that revolutions eventually, partly because of the terror and religious virtue stage, burn out the people.  All the regulations that bind the people and keep them focused become a hazard to progress.  As the revolution weakens and control breaks down there is a necessity for a strong central, no questions asked, dictatorial leader.  Nevertheless, in time internal and very localized differences within the government lead to sacrifice of these leaders as fanatics, terrorists and lunatics.  The cooling period begins.  Sometimes the cooling period progresses quickly as in France, England and the United States, other times it is slow and volatile as in the case of Russia.

SUMMARY

According to Brinton, beginning at page 250 there are certain uniformities that lead up to and lead to each step of revolution as identified by his study.  First, are the preliminary stage elements that come into play in setting the stage for Phase One of revolution.  The state of the economy is generally good.  There are not extreme forms of discontent expressed by a large group of non-prosperous people.  Actually this may expressed as antagonism which arises not for want of necessary things, but rather because people come to see disparity in what they want and what they have (251).  Hence, overwhelmingly the revolution partakers are those of bourgeois class who are embittered because they do not have access to the aristocratic life.  This leads to a related class issue.  Brinton notes that revolution seems to occur when social classes are closer in proximity and social intercourse than when distant.  This may work with the fact that those who have attained a degree of economic success are much like Simmel’s stranger, they are in the midst of the aristocracy, yet so far when it comes to being the aristocracy.  This enhances many strong feelings about privilege.  There is the uniformity of transfer of intellectual allegiance.  In addition, as with the other uniformities, all of the revolutions suffered from ineffectual government.  Russia suffered less, but still suffered this to a degree.  These preliminary uniformities meld with a characteristic of ruling class ineptness.  In short, the ruling class loses its focus, unity, drive and therefore strength.  Some of the ruling class ranks, which begin to distrust their own class, traditions, habits, and intellectualism, enhance this.  Some will leave and join ranks of the dissatisfied.  Politically the ruling class becomes inept.  Combining these uniformities in varying degree with governmental inefficiency leads to government being unable to “successfully” defend itself or use force to control the ones who desire revolution (252).  In bringing about the preliminary stage of revolution, Brinton concludes that it is not the strength or planning and organization of the revolutionists that bring success, but rather the ineptness of the old regime to control the public or their own integral operations of government, police and military.

            As the First Stage are realized, a point occurs which organizes and unifies the revolutionaries, both moderates and extremists to act.  As long as the focus is overthrow of the old regime, they remain organized and unanimous.  Even after the initial stage, they are unanimous and honeymoon-like, but this changes as the old regime vanishes, and the surviving members are executed, flee, or are vanquished from the country.  Unity breaks down as groups emerge, some more radical than others and some more moderate.  Moderates initially for a period move into government, but lack power to organize people who are in the fever of the moment.  The extremists must obtain power from the moderates and are perhaps best pictured as current revolution against the moderates who now have the appearance of the old regime and therefore represent an “unfinished revolution”.  Fighting, violence and disputes continue until the extremists stage a coup on the moderates and once again execute, or alienate the surviving moderates.  This is now the Crisis Stage.

            In this Crisis Stage, the government leaders move one more step to the Left.  It is now a radical government.  There is need to maintain power and force is the answer.  However, force is not just physical it is mental force.  Force through psychological state of mind.  There is a religious dimension and a desire to bring virtue to the people.  The concepts of liberty are still heard.  There must be an establishment of human betterment here on earth in the new society.  Dictates are established by a strong central government, special courts, the military, renaming persons, places and things and strongly enforced codes of moral and ethic.  The moral and ethic issues in particular, but in combination with the force and renaming leads eventually to much strain for common outsiders and some insiders.  The ordinary man in particular is left to flounder (256).  Eventually, this sets the stage for convalescence. 

 

 

References

Brinton, Crane. 1965. The Anatomy of Revolutions. New York, NY: Vintage Books.

Anatomy of Revolution – Brinton Part 1

Of the many kinds of revolutions, this is the attempt to define an “ideal type” of revolution through analysis of four revolutions that share an element of social class struggle.  The English, French and Russian are more or less centrally defined as instances of social class struggle.  The fourth, the American is bifurcated with a beginning with concentrating on territorial-nationalist principles and then taking on an aura of social class struggle (24).  For this and other reasons, the American Revolution is distinguishable from the other three.  However, where the American, English, Russian and French share an element of “class struggle”, the Russian Revolution is distinguishable as to its outcome.  Whereas it, like the other three began with calls for freedom as postulated by the Western world it changed focus and has taken a route other than the familiar democracy (vi, vii, 21).  Nonetheless, Brinton concludes these four revolutions begin with democratic overtones as modern (post-medieval) revolutions.  Other types of revolutions are discussed on page 21.

            The concept of revolution brings to mind many vivid pictures and key word terminology to describe the phenomena and therefore common connotations of the concept as a word range to opposite ends of expression and meaning.  Visualizing a revolution as the “glorious revolution” or the “reign of terror” are appropriate extremes.  Nonetheless, the object of scientific study begs a definition of “revolution”, to wit: “drastic, sudden substitution of one group in charge of the running of a territorial political entity by another group hitherto not running that government (4).  This definition necessarily dispenses with calling any change that is “consensual in nature” such as elective process in the United States or by election.

            In Chapter One Brinton introduces the concept of success.  The concept of success is complementary of another term, “finished” in the preface (vi, 21).  Success means the revolutionists become the new legal government.  To be finished is more ambiguous in meaning but definitely is a more precise term for conclusion of the revolution.  Brinton states in his Preface to the Vintage Edition on page vi that since his earlier edition he has now concluded that the Russian revolution has “finished”.  Later he indicates that although the American Revolution may be a complete territorial-national revolution, as a social revolution it appears to be incomplete (24).  Therefore, a finality and higher level of success may at times be difficult to predict and measure.

OLD REGIMES

Old Regimes are the previous age just before revolution occurs (27).  They define the old way of life and are particular to each society within a general frame of similarity.  Brinton’s examination of each revolution is an attempt to distinguish similarities of each Old Regime and thereby create a framework for anticipating revolution.  He establishes three primary variable categories by which to assess each regime.  These categories are economic and political structure, alienation of intellectuals, and class antagonism.  His conclusion in Chapter Two is that no true and steadfast predictor or combination of variables give a test for predicting when or if revolution will occur.  However, Brinton does conclude that certain relationships between variables exist in his analysis.  In most instances various combinations and intensities of each variable was present before revolution occurred (65).  There is another variable of discontent that is related to each measure.  Each society has some level of discontent and is healthy to a degree (28).  It is when the level of discontent increases in combination with other factors that it becomes indicative in analyzing cause of revolution. 

Economic and Political Variables

Perhaps the economic factor is best summarized by James C. Davies “what provokes a group to attack a government is not simply deprivation or misery, but ‘an intolerable gap between what people want and what they get’” (30).  Hence, as Brinton concludes it is not lack of actual economic return or basic access, but rather a “feeling” of denial of self-value (32).  Brinton states on page 33, “the existence among a group, or groups, of a feeling that prevailing conditions limit or hinder their economic activity”.  Therefore, objectively the group may be economically successful and at once subjectively economically unsuccessful.  Therefore, there is growing consensus of lack of self-fulfillment and potential that translates itself as lack of justice (34).  Brinton provides an excellent summary of the economic discussion on pages 35 and 36.  Turning to political structure it is noted that each regime shared a level of government inefficiency and public impatience with the government.  Here again, some inefficiency and public impatience is normal and is critical only when it reaches a particular level.  As with the economic factor, only with a certain level of impatience will propaganda, action groups, and riots occur.

Intellectual Variable

Ideas are always part of society and they help shape the state of mind of various groups (39).  Hence, ideas may shape group organization for or against a government.  Pressure groups with special aims may use propaganda, lobby efforts or even terrorism in order to succeed in promoting ideals.  Again, such groups are part of society but may contribute to revolution at a particular level or in combination of groups and lead to supplanting legal government with illegal government.  Illegal government is a form of radical change and serves as an indicator of revolution (40-2).  Intellectuals, noted on page 42, play an instrumental role in shaping and communicating ideas that reflect critical analysis and that often disagree.  An excellent thought occurs on page 43 that intellectuals like corpuscles are useful and beneficial to the body (social and physical) in limited number.  In short, the degree, amount and focus of writing and talking about the ideal world, free of social, political and economic difficulties and discontents may lead to revolution.  A critical component is the numerosity of views sponsored of which the intellectual segment of society is the instrumental driving force.  

Class Struggle

Even in a democracy there is class struggle, however it is tempered by circulation of elites through use of their talents.  While the U. S. is the best example, Brinton makes a case that even in France, Russia and England mobility could be enjoyed comparable to individuals like Henry Ford, Bob Hope, or Harry S. Truman (61, 62).  A critical point in which those who are mobile may develop discontent is where a “limitation” has been placed upon their class upward movement or a barrier develops between them and the upper hierarchy.  This comes in the form of being able to generate prestige and recognition, but without commensurate financial reward (French courtiers of the Enlightenment) and generating wealth but diminished return in advanced prestige or recognition in social circles (63, 64).  This most often affects the middle and lower classes and creates greater embitterment against the upper or ruling class (57, 60).  The second type of stoppage of circulation appears to be the more critical factor of frustration with the social order (64).  As an interjection, this may interact with intellectual alienation and spur writing and ideals against the ruling class.  Compounding the issue of class is that some of the ruling class may also begin to find need for change in the government.  They in turn may actively turn against the government, or passively fail to defend it (51, 52).   

FIRST STAGES

Determining first stages of revolution are difficult to determine.  Even in hindsight, labeling a first stage may be debated.  These many differences create great difficulty in determining exactly when a revolution begins (69-76).  Certain uniformity exists in relation to the four case studies.  First, there was governmental attempt to collect money and the people opposed it.  Second, there was a moment of crystallization that creates clear opposition between the old regime and the revolutionists.  Third, there is failure of the old regime to deploy force to control the people.  The actors of the revolution may not even realize the first stage has occurred until much later.  There is debate whether the first stage is spontaneous or planned by the revolutionists (77).  One line of theory is that revolution comes to happen through the internal thought processes of individuals over time.  This process is actually a number of interlocking plots proposed by a group of determined individuals, which eventually come to fruition (79).  The driving element of the other theory is the spontaneous nature by which people are through external factors driven to the point of a united front, which is necessary for “keeping the oppressors in check”.  Often one theory or the other is used by a participant (either of the old or new regime) to explain how the revolution came to occur or fail.

            The honeymoon follows the revolution during the period of victory and initial formulation of the new government.  The honeymoon is short lived.  It quickly fades as the members face the new problems of how to structure and organize the new government.

REVOLUTIONISTS

In discussing the various types of revolutionists, Brinton makes several points.  First, time and era are relevant to whether revolution is considered a valid mode of governmental change (93).  Second, revolutionists come from a cross-section of the people of the old regime.  Third, conditions unique to the revolution affect behavior of revolutionists.  Fourth, there is a moderate stage, and an extremist stage of revolution.

            Brinton analyzes categories of economics and social position, and character and disposition.  When analyzing the economic and social status of revolutionists in the four cases he further breaks down categories for rank and file (followers) and for leaders (95-105).  He concludes that overall revolutionists are not the dregs of society.  Neither rank and file nor leaders come from one clear social or economic segment of society (105).  Hence, both the street fighter and the orator are needed.

            Brinton’s statement on reduction of sociology to psychology on page 105 is noteworthy to the analysis of the character and disposition of revolutionist types.  The typing of people by character and disposition is related to ‘discontent’ of the individual.  He lists ten types of revolutionists in his analysis.  The first is  the gentlemen-revolutionist, the sincere idealist, the opportunist, the old regime failure, the undiscovered and unrewarded, the professional radical, the obscure conservative, crazed men of blood, the fanatic, and the contrary minded (107-13).

RULES OF MODERATES

Moderates come to power partly because they are best suited and proximate to the old regime’s government, referred to as the legal government.  With the first step of revolution, or slightly before in the psychological state power shifts from the Right (Conservative – old regime) to the Moderates and eventually to the Left (Extremists).  This process is called the Sequence of Power (123).  Related to the sequence is the reality of the Dual Sovereignty (132).  Hence, they must leave.

            Perhaps moderates tend because of reality judgment to be “fence sitters” who attempt to hold on to the familiar.  “The revolution, like Saturn, devours its children” (121).   

References

Brinton, Crane. 1965. The Anatomy of Revolutions. New York, NY: Vintage Books.

Reflections on Karl Marx and Revolution

BACKGROUND

Marx is a complex composite influenced by Hegel as well as the post Hegelian thought that influenced the Young Hegelian Leftists, which modified Hegel’s historic approach to dialectical theory.  Following Hegel’s death two primary camps developed – the Right and the Left.  Several key individuals influenced the philosophy of the Leftist Young Hegelians, shaped their thought, and created tension between the Prussian/Christian monarchy and the Leftists.  Key figures are Strauss and his influential position on Christianity, Cieszkowski and his Philosophy of Action (which focused on the future rather than history), Brauer’s focus upon the “self-conscious” central role of the spirit in the opposing/negative world, and Ruge who for some time served as the editor of the Leftist journal.  Marx is connected to these individuals if not directly as in the case of Brauer, indirectly through connections in Berlin.  This philosophy developed to focus upon a philosophy of rejecting the historicity of Hegel in favor of the philosophy of negation, a position of atheism, and a political view sponsoring revolution as a primary mode of action.  Nonetheless, it is imperative to understand that while the Leftists influence Marx in that he accepted some of their philosophies and agreed with the problems they found as needing solutions, he is quite distinguishable in that he had a different view of how history affected the development of society (Chapter II).

EARLY MARX

Even though his first work, his doctoral thesis, entitled On the Differences between the Natural Philosophy of Democritus and of Epicurus is largely influenced by the Young Hegelian thought there is the beginning of Marx’ attempt to identify himself that would place him somewhere between the rational utopians and the conservative positivists.  Within this work, there is seen influence of Hegelian historical approach to the world state of condition as well as acceptance of an anti-utopia view of the history and progress of the world (99).  Moreover, there is the influence, which comes from Hellenistic philosophy and Aristotle’s power of the self-conscious as it relates to the philosophical freedom of the spirit.  His thesis, shaped by Hegelian logic, focused upon Epicureanism.  Thusly, Marx begins to state basic premises that later evolve into his theories regarding praxis, false consciousness and emancipation (perhaps the concept of human potential) (102, 104, 106).  The statement: “the spirit should not remain submissive to existing facts, nor yet believe in the absolute authority of normative criteria which it discovers freely in itself without regard to those facts, but should make of its own freedom a means wherewith to influence the world” seems to postulate self-consciousness as a means of obtaining human potential, hence actualization of freedom “parenclisis” (101, Chapter III).

CONTEMPORARY INFLUENCE FROM HESS AND FEUERBACH

Comparatively speaking Moses Hess and Karl Marx each positively influenced each other.  On the other hand, Marx came to reject most of Feuerbach’s propositions.  Hess developed his own philosophy of communism from the works of Hegel.  Influenced by Hegel, French socialism and the Young Hegelian Leftists, Hess moved from a philosophy of the historical past to the future and from attempting to interpret history to projecting future action.  For Hess, human freedom climaxes in future action and this is the essence of “free action”.  Ultimately, revolution leads to regeneration of society, fulfills Christianity; the result is an authentic religion of love (110).  However, this religion of love has no priests, churches, dogmas, Higher Deity, belief in immortality or education based upon fear.  The statement “there will be no more antagonism between public order and freedom” illustrates this… (110). This transformation is a precondition of communism.  “Moral and social slavery proceeds only from spiritual slavery; and … contrariwise, legal and moral emancipation is bound to result from spiritual liberation.” This illustrates further his thoughts that self-awareness was a vital part of future social harmony and identity of the individual and the collective interest (110).  Hess and Marx met and most likely shared ideas, hence it is possible to see the mutual influence in concepts of alienation, polarized wealth and poverty leading to revolution, religious and economic alienation, and the need to express free creative activity as a means to identify self-consciousness (113).  Feuerbach’s first book The Essence of Christianity, summarized on page 116 espouses the conclusion that the consciousness of man toward an object creates in man the true manifestation of what man are (114).  This contrasts with Hegel’s view that alienation is positive or at least may lead to positive manifestations (116).  Hegel proposed that alienation as an external force may lead to better understanding of self.  What is external and alien is through a process of enrichment absorbed (internalized) and allows fulfillment of self-actualization.  For Feuerbach, the alienation is “evil”.  Thus, religion serves to objectify humans to a level of inferiority and never allows full realization of the human being (religious mystification); it opposes the individuality of self, wastes human energy, and detracts from true value of man as an end unto himself (116).  Marx, from his statements (religion is as an opiate) rather than viewing religion as a central negative force focuses on economic influences that bear upon ultimate social realization.  As Feuerback continues to modify his position in later writings he strays further from Hegel and Marx and comes to reject his position more (118, Chapter IV).

MARX AND HIS EARLY WRITINGS

As editor of the Young Hegelian paper and later as writer, Marx had the opportunity to shape and develop his theories.  Early articles dealt with themes of censorship, property and the essence of freedom.  The Landtag law offered the opportunity to develop his concerns for the rights of humans and the role of law and the state.  Landtag made illegal the ancient tradition of allowing peasants to collect scrap wood and brush from the lands.  Marx concluded that revoking this right of the peasants promoted private property interests of a few, and limited the rights of all people.  Natural rights of all were restricted.  Like Hegel, real law (natural) is distinguished from state law.  State law promotes institutions and is protected by police.  Real law promotes the realization of freedom and should never restrict it (121).  In considering the freedom of press, the written word is an end unto itself.  Later writings that were instrumental to Marx early construction were Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, On the Jewish Question, and Introduction to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.  In both articles regarding Hegel, Marx quickly diverges from Hegelianism (123).  Four points of divergence are worthy of stating in relation to the first article: 1) the state is not an independent entity separate from the people which comprise it, 2) as with religion, the state is to be a reflection of the people which organize it, not the converse, 3) the proper aim of democracy is to make government the instrument of man, and 4) humans are not mere moments or stages in development of the universe.  In conclusion, the state may not legitimately set the pace for the general mood of the people, but rather the people have the power to set the mood for the state (124).  Hence, civil authority should dictate political authority (124).  When the state becomes a “tool” of a select few, the state stops being a mediator or as Hegel claimed a synthesizer, and becomes a tool of special interest groups (125).  In his work On the Jewish Question, it is noteworthy that the only way man may rediscover himself is by individual true consciousness and as bearer of the total community (127).  A particular point is that in writing Introduction to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx conceptualizes what will serve to be his principle that the proletariat has a special mission as a class.  It will be the heart of the emancipation philosophy that will ultimately serve to liberate and abolish the class system and private property (130).  It is the realization of revolution, which is in itself a violation of history that will enable the simultaneous fulfillment of the emancipation (127,128).  This awakening of consciousness will be the heart of his theory of scientific socialism.  Ultimately, this will serve to unify political and social life and serves to establish six principles noted on page 131 (Chapter V).

PARIS, ALIENATED LABOR AND ENGELS

In the “Paris Manuscripts” Marx constructs the “full and perfect reconciliation of human essence and existence” (141).  Humanity and humankind’s being are harmonized in communism.  These writings serve to provide a partial theme for his later work Capital.  Within this context, the themes of labor and alienation are more clarified.  Labor is the basic characteristic of humankind and serves to establish a human consciousness and oneness with the world.  This serves to form a social relationship with nature (138).  Alienation comes not only as labor is commoditized but also as the worker comes to be alienated from both the work he/she performs as well as the product constructed.  This leads to animalized feelings, which serve to destruct human ability thereby penalizing not only the individual but also the larger community.  Noteworthy is that this alienation not only occurs to the individual proletarian but also to the capitalist in the form of becoming the object of money.  Hence, the capitalist becomes an abstraction of “money-power”.  An excellent quote regarding the capitalist is on page 139.  Private property, division of labor and human alienation are not mistakes.  Rather they are natural historic progression to a state in which natural conditions develop and “indispensable” future liberation may occur (141).  This leads to Marx finding that from within, from inner understanding an act occurs and it is this act which in turn affects the subject thereby allowing the subject to understand it.  In other words, the subject and the act coincide; this brings about self-recognition (144, Chapter VI).

EARLY 19^TH CENTURY SOCIALIST IDEAS AND MARXIST SOCIALISM

Socialist ideas arose in light of the Industrial and French revolutions.  A central conviction of all the myriad socialist groups is that uncontrolled concentration of wealth and unrestricted competition creates misery (183).  Only an organized redistribution of production and exchange would end poverty and oppression that accompanied this concentration of wealth and limited competition.  Socialism (Leroux) came to be qualified by many diverse means by which to achieve the correction of the problem (183).  Of those categorized as utopian three propositions arise that anticipate Marx.  These are categorized as historiosophical, capitalist, and socialist future (220-21).  Within each of these categories several points may be listed which exemplify a propositional statement or viewpoint of what Marx comes to postulate.  One particular socialist, Proudhon, a seeker of social justice, a son of a brewery worker, whose slogan was “property is theft” received particular criticism from Marx (224-7).  In summary, Marx concluded that Proudhon failed to note that the historical process is a dynamic process (227).  Technology drives the change that occurs and no amount of moralizing, attempting to revise outmoded structures or simply removing an obstacle (contender) will bring social upheaval.  Rather, only the historical process of struggle will eventually elevate the proper party (the proletariat) to revolution whereby class will be reduced to one level with no differences (227).  In turning to the summation of Marx, it is necessary to note The Communist Manifesto.  Within this short but complete document lays his theory of society and his beliefs for action.  With this work, there are no further revisions.  Within this document are the influence of Engels’ writings of the dialectic nature and materialism.

 

References

Kolakowski, Leszek. 1976. Main Currents of Marxism. —-: Oxford Paperbacks. Vol. 1, Ch 2-7, 10.

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1906. Manifesto of the Communist Party. Chicago, IL: Charles H. Kerr & Company.

Parsons and Structure of Social Action

  In Parsons’ words “this study is … study of one particular problem … the emergence of the theoretical system which has been called the ‘voluntaristic theory of action’” (14).  A critical point to understand about the purpose of The Structure of Social Action is stated in the Preface To The Second Edition; it is “intended to be primarily a contribution to systematic social science” (A, B).  Accordingly, the analysis is one of comparing and contrasting convergent theoretical development related to the scientific analysis of social phenomena.  This is the starting point for Parsons’ study and endeavor to determine a process by which to maximize the study of social action and dynamics.  What he envisions is development of an indispensable, preliminary, and accurate process by which knowledge may be developed.  The system he envisions provides a systematic understanding of theories and their processes in relation to rational action.

            Although the book in part examines four major social contributors, Alfred Marshall, Vilfredo Pareto, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber it is rather in purpose designed as a primary source material.  Rather than explore these theorists for their particular theoretical contributions, Parsons considers the totality of their contributions as they contribute to the sum total of the scientific structure of the system of theory itself.  This is a key point that the reader must not miss.  Hence, the four theorists are followed in order to better understand the development of the theoretical system (vi).  Through this analysis, it is argued that scientific theory in the social science is a product of observation, reasoning and verification.  This process examines facts, applies reason and then returns to the facts for verification.  A “fact” for this textual study is adopted from Professor Henderson, “empirically verifiable statement about phenomena in terms of a conceptual scheme” (41).  Empiricism refers to the claim that “categories of a given theoretical system are by themselves adequate to explain all scientifically important facts” about the concrete phenomena considered (69-70).

THEORETICAL SYSTEM

The proper structure of a theoretical system may be stated as a single body of systematic theoretical reasoning traceable through a critical analysis.  Hence, we find that there is a “logical structure” for theory (7).  Therefore, a theoretical system must not simply observe facts and make logical conclusions.  If empirically correct, it must also be capable of allowing for prediction or tell, “what empirical facts it should be possible to observe in a given set of circumstances” (8).  This process requires at a minimum that the theorist take into consideration all relevant known facts that may be obtained and then investigate each to see if they agree with the theory.  After this, the theorist must verify those expectations of theory that appear to agree with the facts as presented.  This process is what makes the “system” of theoretical science.  Only in this way is it possible to simultaneously state what is currently known, allow questions to be formulated about what needs to be known, and then test alternatives and possible answers for answers.

            Facts, which are not yet connected with, or fail to be in relation with theory do not constitute “science” (16).  These residuals, are only bits and pieces of knowledge and are not to be confused with the positive theoretical system.  Theoretical systems must deal with empirically identifiable variables.  A goal of the scientific system is to eliminate from consideration the residual categories from science and focus upon the positively defined, empirical variables (19).  Only such a systematic theoretical study will allow science to progress.  This is a major distinction between science and philosophy.

Philosophy

Science and philosophy are not the same, but they may provide mutual benefits.  The example of Kant is illustrative (24).  Philosophy is a residual category because it is a mere attempt to rationalize cognitive understanding of the human experience in ways other than by empiric evidence (21).  A key concept to consider is that of methodology.  As a preface, consider that for each positive there is a negative (22).  For each scientific theory, there are philosophical consequences and other assumptions.  Good or bad, the duality exists.  Some questions will lead to valid knowledge through empirically valid propositions.  This process is methodology.  Methodology is narrowly defined as “considered general grounds for validity of scientific propositions” (24).  This definition is more than research technique through interview, questionnaire or statistical analysis.  Hence, methodology separates science from philosophy, which is based in logic and epistemology.  

Concepts

There are different types of theoretical concepts and type determines how the concept is formed (or perhaps framed) for scientific study.  The quote from Henderson illustrates this point well: “all empirical observation is ‘in terms of a conceptual scheme’” (28).  Language differences are good to provide an example of how structure of concepts differs.  Parsons calls these descriptive frames of reference or schemata (28).  These schemata represent a methodological level of scientific observation.  Of these, the schema of social action, proposing that concrete individuals adapt means of reaching ends is instrumental (30).  (This sounds like Weber’s rational action.)  To relate the earlier discussion, empirical facts must be considered within the schema or conceptualization.  Similar to Weber’s historical individual this process of using schema allows for phenomena of interest to be identified and defined within groups (conceptualized) and then studied meaningfully.  Concepts may then be referenced or broken down into parts for further examination.  The goal is to devise observational operations by which the scheme allows examination of empirical evidence and thereby allows problems to be answered (37 – 39).

            Therefore, a theoretical system must include a frame of reference, conceptualized structure of concrete systems to which the frame applies and certain “parts”.  The main aspect of the part is related to its structure in systems of action; the skeleton or social structure.  This analysis of social structure is therefore critically related to action schema, and as Parsons notes provides the name of the text The Structure of Social Action (39).

THEORY OF ACTION

Parsons’ theoretical systems for social science relies upon the finding that an action is a unit or part.  There must be an “actor”, the “end” of the act, and the “situation” which initiated the actor to act.  Note B on page 77 explores this concept in detail.  The situation may allow for control or lack of control over the act.  These may be called means or conditions respectively.  Further, the relationship between the parts may allow for normative alternatives.  Factors of the action are time, choice, actor’s subjective point of view, physical environment/ biological organism,    (45).  Time moves from present to future.  Without the actor doing something the future would not change.  By this process, actors ‘achieve, realize or achieve ends.  In this fashion, the system is its own atom.  Parsons later seems to use this for his basis in listing atomism as the first predominant feature of a developing system (56, 743).  Choice equates to “range of choice open to the actor”.  There is range of choice in the means of acting and in the ends of the future result as affected by the normative orientation.  Error is potential in this process because of error in choice.  The external world interplays upon the individual actor’s subjective state.  Hence, it is necessary to determine whether action is brought about by the external world or the actors’ internal point of view.  Physical environment may impinge upon the action.  As a final note, it is not the actor as an individual that is the atom, but rather the unit act that is the atom (72).

            In his discussion of utilitarianism Parsons notes that a major problem with social thinkers has been to justify (“values”) course of conduct or policy which they propose rather than evaluate objective and understandable facts (53).  He argues his point using primarily the ethical and religious contexts of Christianity and secondarily the cultural thought of the Greek polis (53-55).  The antithesis of the faulty objective to explain based upon value leads to the second predominate feature of a developing system, which is “rationality”.  This is not to be fully explained by a discussion of irrationality or nonrationality.  Rather the positive norm of rationality is action understood to be guided “by scientific or … scientifically sound knowledge of the circumstances of the actor” (58).  This translates to evaluation of what ends are possible within the conditions of the particular situation and then judging which means are reasonably understood and verified to be available and best adapted to meet the ends (the rational acting unit).  This unit (automism, rationality, empiricism, and random ends) allows for concrete empiricism and completes the utilitarian system.  Parsons notes that rationality also plays a role in the theory of action.  Unitarianism, positivism and idealism are synthesized into his theory of action. 

Voluntaristic Action

Action is voluntary and involves an actor, goals of individual actors, alternative means for achieving goals and desires, internal and external constraints that affect choice, and subjective decisions by the actors (60-69).  The utilitarian assigns a degree of rationality to the actor, therefore unitarianism may be said to be positivistic, but there are other positivist examples (62).  Positivist thought was central to Marshal, Pareto, and Durkheim.  

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Parsons concludes analysis with a reminder that he has attempted an empirical study.  It does not matter that the theories of the theorists considered dealt with various phenomena; rather these theorists were the empirical data by which the process of development of scientific thought has been studied.  A synthesis of concepts related to the utilitarian, positivist, and idealist leads to a “voluntaristic theory of action”.  By this theory enables the categorization of social phenomena.  From this theory, five particular theses have been concluded.

Five Theses

First, there is an outline or structure called the voluntaristic theory of action (62).  This is so even though different theorists examined used different terminology (720).  Second, these differing categories as a whole create a new system that although it includes parts of earlier systems fails to have all parts of any one system therefore it is individually incompatible with any prior system.  Third, as a whole the new system allows for understanding and explanation (closeness) of each earlier writer’s empirical views whether positivistic, evolutionary, utilitarian or idealistic.  Fourth, there remains much study to be done.  Hence, empirical study is ongoing (721).  Fifth, empirical study is a multifaceted process.  In order to better understand phenomenon there is need for a fully integrated systematic approach to study of empirical facts.  Without this approach, several fallacies arise as set forth on page 726. 

            The bottom line is that the development of empirical knowledge must be an integral part of measuring the development of social change.  This method is not simply of dominating importance to study of dynamics, but of major importance (726). 

Implications of the Study

Many things need to continue to be done.  The verification part of theory requires that scientists continue to test theory against empirical fact.  However, it is fair for scientists to set limits and parameters upon their work and identify the context of their study.  By defining the parameters of investigation a theorist may come to conclude his/her work and leave additional investigation and verification to other scientists (727).  The establishing of parameters of a study relates to the defining of the problem in the initial investigation.           Though attempting to limit the study to empiric evidence Parsons admits that he has had to rely in part upon philosophical considerations (728). 

             

 

Reference

Parsons, Talcott. [1937] 1961. The Structure of Social Action.  New York, NY: The Free Press of Glencoe.

Marx: Currents Of Revolution

BACKGROUND

Marx is a complex composite influenced by Hegel as well as the post Hegelian thought that influenced the Young Hegelian Leftists, which modified Hegel’s historic approach to dialectical theory.  Following Hegel’s death two primary camps developed – the Right and the Left.  Several key individuals influenced the philosophy of the Leftist Young Hegelians, shaped their thought, and created tension between the Prussian/Christian monarchy and the Leftists.  Key figures are Strauss and his influential position on Christianity, Cieszkowski and his Philosophy of Action (which focused on the future rather than history), Brauer’s focus upon the “self-conscious” central role of the spirit in the opposing/negative world, and Ruge who for some time served as the editor of the Leftist journal.  Marx is connected to these individuals if not directly as in the case of Brauer, indirectly through connections in Berlin.  This philosophy developed to focus upon a philosophy of rejecting the historicity of Hegel in favor of the philosophy of negation, a position of atheism, and a political view sponsoring revolution as a primary mode of action.  Nonetheless, it is imperative to understand that while the Leftists influence Marx in that he accepted some of their philosophies and agreed with the problems they found as needing solutions, he is quite distinguishable in that he had a different view of how history affected the development of society (Chapter II).

EARLY MARX

Even though his first work, his doctoral thesis, entitled On the Differences between the Natural Philosophy of Democritus and of Epicurus is largely influenced by the Young Hegelian thought there is the beginning of Marx’ attempt to identify himself that would place him somewhere between the rational utopians and the conservative positivists.  Within this work, there is seen influence of Hegelian historical approach to the world state of condition as well as acceptance of an anti-utopia view of the history and progress of the world (99).  Moreover, there is the influence, which comes from Hellenistic philosophy and Aristotle’s power of the self-conscious as it relates to the philosophical freedom of the spirit.  His thesis, shaped by Hegelian logic, focused upon Epicureanism.  Thusly, Marx begins to state basic premises that later evolve into his theories regarding praxis, false consciousness and emancipation (perhaps the concept of human potential) (102, 104, 106).  The statement: “the spirit should not remain submissive to existing facts, nor yet believe in the absolute authority of normative criteria which it discovers freely in itself without regard to those facts, but should make of its own freedom a means wherewith to influence the world” seems to postulate self-consciousness as a means of obtaining human potential, hence actualization of freedom “parenclisis” (101, Chapter III).

CONTEMPORARY INFLUENCE FROM HESS AND FEUERBACH

Comparatively speaking Moses Hess and Karl Marx each positively influenced each other.  On the other hand, Marx came to reject most of Feuerbach’s propositions.  Hess developed his own philosophy of communism from the works of Hegel.  Influenced by Hegel, French socialism and the Young Hegelian Leftists, Hess moved from a philosophy of the historical past to the future and from attempting to interpret history to projecting future action.  For Hess, human freedom climaxes in future action and this is the essence of “free action”.  Ultimately, revolution leads to regeneration of society, fulfills Christianity; the result is an authentic religion of love (110).  However, this religion of love has no priests, churches, dogmas, Higher Deity, belief in immortality or education based upon fear.  The statement “there will be no more antagonism between public order and freedom” illustrates this… (110). This transformation is a precondition of communism.  “Moral and social slavery proceeds only from spiritual slavery; and … contrariwise, legal and moral emancipation is bound to result from spiritual liberation.” This illustrates further his thoughts that self-awareness was a vital part of future social harmony and identity of the individual and the collective interest (110).  Hess and Marx met and most likely shared ideas, hence it is possible to see the mutual influence in concepts of alienation, polarized wealth and poverty leading to revolution, religious and economic alienation, and the need to express free creative activity as a means to identify self-consciousness (113).  Feuerbach’s first book The Essence of Christianity, summarized on page 116 espouses the conclusion that the consciousness of man toward an object creates in man the true manifestation of what man are (114).  This contrasts with Hegel’s view that alienation is positive or at least may lead to positive manifestations (116).  Hegel proposed that alienation as an external force may lead to better understanding of self.  What is external and alien is through a process of enrichment absorbed (internalized) and allows fulfillment of self-actualization.  For Feuerbach, the alienation is “evil”.  Thus, religion serves to objectify humans to a level of inferiority and never allows full realization of the human being (religious mystification); it opposes the individuality of self, wastes human energy, and detracts from true value of man as an end unto himself (116).  Marx, from his statements (religion is as an opiate) rather than viewing religion as a central negative force focuses on economic influences that bear upon ultimate social realization.  As Feuerback continues to modify his position in later writings he strays further from Hegel and Marx and comes to reject his position more (118, Chapter IV).

MARX AND HIS EARLY WRITINGS

As editor of the Young Hegelian paper and later as writer, Marx had the opportunity to shape and develop his theories.  Early articles dealt with themes of censorship, property and the essence of freedom.  The Landtag law offered the opportunity to develop his concerns for the rights of humans and the role of law and the state.  Landtag made illegal the ancient tradition of allowing peasants to collect scrap wood and brush from the lands.  Marx concluded that revoking this right of the peasants promoted private property interests of a few, and limited the rights of all people.  Natural rights of all were restricted.  Like Hegel, real law (natural) is distinguished from state law.  State law promotes institutions and is protected by police.  Real law promotes the realization of freedom and should never restrict it (121).  In considering the freedom of press, the written word is an end unto itself.  Later writings that were instrumental to Marx early construction were Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, On the Jewish Question, and Introduction to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.  In both articles regarding Hegel, Marx quickly diverges from Hegelianism (123).  Four points of divergence are worthy of stating in relation to the first article: 1) the state is not an independent entity separate from the people which comprise it, 2) as with religion, the state is to be a reflection of the people which organize it, not the converse, 3) the proper aim of democracy is to make government the instrument of man, and 4) humans are not mere moments or stages in development of the universe.  In conclusion, the state may not legitimately set the pace for the general mood of the people, but rather the people have the power to set the mood for the state (124).  Hence, civil authority should dictate political authority (124).  When the state becomes a “tool” of a select few, the state stops being a mediator or as Hegel claimed a synthesizer, and becomes a tool of special interest groups (125).  In his work On the Jewish Question, it is noteworthy that the only way man may rediscover himself is by individual true consciousness and as bearer of the total community (127).  A particular point is that in writing Introduction to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx conceptualizes what will serve to be his principle that the proletariat has a special mission as a class.  It will be the heart of the emancipation philosophy that will ultimately serve to liberate and abolish the class system and private property (130).  It is the realization of revolution, which is in itself a violation of history that will enable the simultaneous fulfillment of the emancipation (127,128).  This awakening of consciousness will be the heart of his theory of scientific socialism.  Ultimately, this will serve to unify political and social life and serves to establish six principles noted on page 131 (Chapter V).

PARIS, ALIENATED LABOR AND ENGELS

In the “Paris Manuscripts” Marx constructs the “full and perfect reconciliation of human essence and existence” (141).  Humanity and humankind’s being are harmonized in communism.  These writings serve to provide a partial theme for his later work Capital.  Within this context, the themes of labor and alienation are more clarified.  Labor is the basic characteristic of humankind and serves to establish a human consciousness and oneness with the world.  This serves to form a social relationship with nature (138).  Alienation comes not only as labor is commoditized but also as the worker comes to be alienated from both the work he/she performs as well as the product constructed.  This leads to animalized feelings, which serve to destruct human ability thereby penalizing not only the individual but also the larger community.  Noteworthy is that this alienation not only occurs to the individual proletarian but also to the capitalist in the form of becoming the object of money.  Hence, the capitalist becomes an abstraction of “money-power”.  An excellent quote regarding the capitalist is on page 139.  Private property, division of labor and human alienation are not mistakes.  Rather they are natural historic progression to a state in which natural conditions develop and “indispensable” future liberation may occur (141).  This leads to Marx finding that from within, from inner understanding an act occurs and it is this act which in turn affects the subject thereby allowing the subject to understand it.  In other words, the subject and the act coincide; this brings about self-recognition (144, Chapter VI).

EARLY 19^TH CENTURY SOCIALIST IDEAS AND MARXIST SOCIALISM

Socialist ideas arose in light of the Industrial and French revolutions.  A central conviction of all the myriad socialist groups is that uncontrolled concentration of wealth and unrestricted competition creates misery (183).  Only an organized redistribution of production and exchange would end poverty and oppression that accompanied this concentration of wealth and limited competition.  Socialism (Leroux) came to be qualified by many diverse means by which to achieve the correction of the problem (183).  Of those categorized as utopian three propositions arise that anticipate Marx.  These are categorized as historiosophical, capitalist, and socialist future (220-21).  Within each of these categories several points may be listed which exemplify a propositional statement or viewpoint of what Marx comes to postulate.  One particular socialist, Proudhon, a seeker of social justice, a son of a brewery worker, whose slogan was “property is theft” received particular criticism from Marx (224-7).  In summary, Marx concluded that Proudhon failed to note that the historical process is a dynamic process (227).  Technology drives the change that occurs and no amount of moralizing, attempting to revise outmoded structures or simply removing an obstacle (contender) will bring social upheaval.  Rather, only the historical process of struggle will eventually elevate the proper party (the proletariat) to revolution whereby class will be reduced to one level with no differences (227).  In turning to the summation of Marx, it is necessary to note The Communist Manifesto.  Within this short but complete document lays his theory of society and his beliefs for action.  With this work, there are no further revisions.  Within this document are the influence of Engels’ writings of the dialectic nature and materialism.

References

Kolakowski, Leszek. 1976. Main Currents of Marxism. —-: Oxford Paperbacks. Vol. 1, Ch 2-7, 10.

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1906. Manifesto of the Communist Party. Chicago, IL: Charles H. Kerr & Company.

Epistemology of Criminology

An epistemological study is “a study or theory of the grounds and nature of knowledge with reference to limits and validity” (Merriam-Webster).  The readings this week complement a thread examining the history of the developing study of criminology as a science.  By way of introduction, Swaaningen provides a history that has been dictated by external factors such as politics, media and even select academic fields such as law, psychology and sociology as well as economics.  In this article, the history is exemplified by a case study of the Dutch model.  In turn a proposal is made that incorporates the certain elements from the labeling model of the 1970’s with the need for independence in academic study and revised, up-to-date research methodology that will enable study of current trend crime of the 21^st Century.

            Rafter, in the article Somotyping, traces the history of criminology upon a case study of Sheldon’s Body Type Study for Correlating Delinquency and draws upon similarities to show how historical perspectives shape criminology not so much because of being true or false, probable or improbable, but by how it is presented and constructed over time through use of different audiences (Rafter 2007:826).

            Walters, in New Modes, provides a recent history of the commoditization of criminological research in the academic environment. 

SWAANINGEN

The central thought contained in this article is that the ‘role’ or ‘focus’ of the study of criminology has often been controlled by external forces (262, 269).  Ironically, Swaaningen writes much like a politician seeking to sell a product.  At times, the writing style seems a bit unprofessional and not substantiated by factual data but rather by feelings (251, 256, 257, 264).  Nonetheless, this Dutch study makes the point that external groups (249-50) have often orchestrated the method, purpose and parameters of study of criminology.

            The examination of the historical development gives a concise look at the development of criminology since the 1830’s in Belgium to the early developments in 1880’s Netherlands (252).  Particular eras of decline and ascention in the field of criminology are focused upon.  These eras are the 1970’s which sponsor a desire to improve humanity and are strongly driven by sociological tone (254-58).  The first professional journal in criminology in 1959, the Netherlands Journal for Criminology (253), and the 1960’s movement toward greater research methodology influence this period.  Following the 1960’s influence from Herman Bianchi led the study and educational endeavors for criminology, influenced by labeling theory, stigmatization, and criminalization, as well as Mertonian theories of anomie and strain (255).  During these decades criminology suffered from the dictates of funding as well as failure to establish professions that required a degree in criminology.  Hence, periodically criminology continued to wax, wane, and shift from one department to another, principally law, or the social sciences.  When funding was slack so was research.

            Partly because of little attention and position in the educational realm research methodology became sloppy, free spirited and opinionated (257, 264).  This in part was revitalized in the 1980’s (257).  Students were discouraged because no jobs called for their skills, educators and researchers were underfunded and felt their subject area failed to have sufficient academic recognition.  As a result, it is premised that history reflects that criminology’s scientific development is controlled by external forces such as externally defined importance of sponsored research and Law schools, and crime administrators (258).

            A new philosophy to “solve crime” rather than to build a better world advanced the study of criminology beginning in the 1990’s.  Parliament began to appoint more criminologists to commissions and the media began to give greater coverage to their statements.  Hence, law and media become external factors (258).  On the down side, much attention has been given to the “statement” rather than the research.  This mediatisation of crime and disorder is both positive and negative in effect.  It is good because focus is on crime and need to study, but bad because the focus is the statement made rather than critical review of the data.  Criminologists have been made into solvers of problems (which is the role of law enforcement) rather than those who study criminology.

            New types of crime bring the need to review the past attempts at criminology, to salvage what is good and combine it with new methodology so that the new crime can be better studied, analyzed and predicted (259, 261, 263-4).  Hence, with a new research focus speared by the University of Leyden and greater independence of study criminologists may move to answer the questions regarding the new myriad of crimes being introduced (260).  Combining the 1970’s desire to seek independence and create a holistic environment with greater academic freedom with an academic challenge to study deviance, social control and focus upon theory, research methods and techniques unique to criminology will lead to a better understanding and academic place for criminology (265).  This will free criminology from being a dependent sub-stratum of other disciplines and enable it to study the evolving crime in the world today.  In part, the establishment of criminology as a unique study will enable it to be freed from being funded as a “step-child”.  These unique characteristics are summarized on page 265 and 266.  The conclusion is that the policy decisions of the past have dictated funding and direction of study.  Serious academics in the field of criminology must control of their study and focus. 

Critically speaking, while these are noteworthy aspirations it seems that regardless all disciplines are somewhat at the disposal of outside funding.  At the heart of the educational system is the non-profit brick wall.  Until academia becomes a for profit institution or at least certain organizations within education do there will be little freedom from external funding constraints.  The desire for independence is admirable and needed, but in order to succeed needs more than mere words of inspiration.

RAFTER

Rafter’s thoughts make for an interesting article explaining the need to critically analyze scientific theory not simply by scientific methodology and technique, but also using other criterion.  Social sciences including criminology are not in a vacuum of their own.  They exist in historical context of the world that is ever changing.  In Somatotyping, Rafter details the work of William Sheldon in his study of the human body (biology) as a means to predict delinquency and criminal conduct.  He asks four questions in attempting to analyze the discreditation of Sheldon (807).  As Swaaningen and Walters, he connects the historical context to the development of criminology.  Diverging from Swaaningen, Rafter relates how one individual although discredited by fellow academia may gather followers and manage for many years to influence a field of study.  Sheldon although critiqued and discredited for lack of proper statistical analysis and measurement error, failure to use random sampling and his improper defining of delinquents managed to secure prominent sponsors who funded his research (815, 817-20).  As a result, he continued to influence a select segment of readers with his value system.  Critically speaking it may be this that has in some ways discredited a professional field of study in criminology.   Sometimes, singular events of illegitimacy lead to stigmatizing an entire field of study.   In essence, Sheldon used the public desire to cure “social ills” as a bait to gather a following of educated people of influence and financial means (820, 824).  Perhaps of greatest importance does Rafter pose the answer to the fourth question as to why his delinquency correlation continues to create interest.  In short, the nature of science it to “validate” the findings of others and hence there is a scientific desire within some researchers to seek a better understanding of Sheldons antimodernist analysis (825).  Perhaps a better word would be that science attempts to continue to test or verify findings rather than validate.

WALTERS

Similar to both Swaaningen and Rafter, Walters seeks to use history as a means to trace criminology and point out how criminology has come to the current state.  Swaaningen focused upon external politics and institutional concerns as pivotal in funding and directing focus of academic study.  Rafter used the narrowly focused qualitative analysis of Sheldon’s manipulation of wealthy and although educated, but ignorant (as to his discipline) sponsors to fund his work.  In both instances, external forces greatly influenced the state of the work being studied.  Walters takes a different approach and questions whether external forces may commoditize criminology.  Critically speaking, are we all in some degree commoditized by how others view the need of our ability or whether they desire our being?  His quote of Toffler, “The litmus test for assessing quality must be content, and not volume, popularity, political versatility or pragmatic relevance” is relevant (5).  Accordingly, how much of what we propose to society is accepted because it is factual and supported by positive analysis, and how much is simply accepted because it “feels good”?  Again, Toffler’s statement on the culture of music is relevant to this analogy (6).  As Walters puts it so well, is growth of criminological scholarship necessarily a sign of a discipline in a healthy state (6)?

            New modes of governance have come to affect criminological scholarship.  Economics and business models of accountability, risk management and profit margin drive some of this.  Since the mid 1980’s economics have played a large role in redefining academic research in general and criminological research has not evaded this phenomena (6, 11, 14).

            The production of crime control knowledge has become modified.  An example of this is a modified liberal mode of government.  In this case, government becomes a partner in a venture with research.  Government’s role has evolved to one of managing crime rather that solving crime.  Perhaps technology played a role in causing this change of focus.  However, the point is that crime is now approached from the standpoint of a business analysis.  Crime is an ill-effect and must be managed as any other risk.  Hence, the risk management model of business is applied to crime.  Those researching crime no longer focus on crime as an object to be analyzed, but rather the focus is on “management” of phenomena known as crime (7).  In other words, objectives and goals of research change.  The researcher becomes a tool of management.  Several predictions may be made, including crime is no longer an object of science, the researcher no longer creates the design of the research, but rather the party financing the research (researchers become hired brokers), greater focus is on fiscal accountability and time management, and politics and policy define research.  With control from external benefactors who finance research comes dictates regarding confidentiality and freedom of academic expression.  The quote from O’Malley is quite well used at page 9.  This restriction of academic freedom leads to lack of independence in the researcher’s decisions, influence, and control and is a result of coercion, profit schemes and so on.  The bottom line is that researchers need to maintain control of research and academic freedom to share research in order not to stifle academic scholarship (10). 

            The change in the role of government trickles down to affect many academic areas.  Technological advancement allows for greater contact and review by government.  The financial relationship becomes one of contract in law and thereby binds the researcher to follow procedure and restrict confidential information that may be in contradiction to codes of ethics regarding research, and may ultimately lead to conflict or strain (my addition) for the researcher.

            In the university setting this contract translates to make the university subject to external control and leads it to implement managerial-economic principles which may sound feasible in the business setting, but may stifle research which in its own right may not always be profitable.  With economic woes facing universities, they are often enticed to these relationships and may pressure faculty into these relationships.  Some faculty may actually seek these contracts and commoditize their research.  Some may leave academia, become entrepreneurs, and privately enter these contracts.  As government and private institutions seek to contract research in criminology in particular effects may be pressure to attract funding, minimal levels of annual publication, minimal levels of annual research, increased competition for funding and the creation of an air of secrecy that stifles sharing of findings (13-14).  It is easy to see why some criminologists may become private researchers.  The answer is money.  In short, whether research is through the institution or private contract the down side is that critical review of each other’s work is limited.  Confidentiality forms may prohibit peer-review, bias may be more prevalent because of the need to “stay on the good side” of the funder.  Secrecy may lead to much unneeded duplication and even competition rather than promoting the genuine search for knowledge (16).  In addition, the environment has tended to lead to a limiting of the critical process.  Publication that is not politically on point may be refused both at the peer review level and in texts (20).      

CONCLUSION

 Whether commoditized, solicited by favoritism or at the behest of political tides the criminological study may be victimized by economics.  The proponent may be outside interests or the researcher.  In short, in each of these instances to some degree criminological scholarship has been commoditized by the wax and wane of external economic factors.  This is not to say that criminology is a unique situation, rather like many other academic areas there is need to avoid research disproportionately driven by profit.     

             

 

Reference

Merriam-Webster Online. 2009.  Epistemolocical. Merriam-Webster.  Retrieved January 25, 2009 (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/epistemologicalhttp://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/epistemological).

Rafter, Nicole. 2007. Somatotyping, Antimodernism, and the Production of Criminological Knowledge. Criminology. Vol 45 4, 805-833.

Swaaningen, Rene van.  2006. In Search of Criminology’s Epistemological Threshold. Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance, Vol 7 249-270.

Walters, Reece. 2003.  New Modes of Governance and the Commodification of Criminological Knowledge. Social Legal Studies. Vol 12:1, 5-26.

Talcott Parsons: Structure of Social Action

In Parsons’ words “this study is … study of one particular problem … the emergence of the theoretical system which has been called the ‘voluntaristic theory of action’” (14).  A critical point to understand about the purpose of The Structure of Social Action is stated in the Preface To The Second Edition; it is “intended to be primarily a contribution to systematic social science” (A, B).  Accordingly, the analysis is one of comparing and contrasting convergent theoretical development related to the scientific analysis of social phenomena.  This is the starting point for Parsons’ study and endeavor to determine a process by which to maximize the study of social action and dynamics.  What he envisions is development of an indispensable, preliminary, and accurate process by which knowledge may be developed.  The system he envisions provides a systematic understanding of theories and their processes in relation to rational action.

            Although the book in part examines four major social contributors, Alfred Marshall, Vilfredo Pareto, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber it is rather in purpose designed as a primary source material.  Rather than explore these theorists for their particular theoretical contributions, Parsons considers the totality of their contributions as they contribute to the sum total of the scientific structure of the system of theory itself.  This is a key point that the reader must not miss.  Hence, the four theorists are followed in order to better understand the development of the theoretical system (vi).  Through this analysis, it is argued that scientific theory in the social science is a product of observation, reasoning and verification.  This process examines facts, applies reason and then returns to the facts for verification.  A “fact” for this textual study is adopted from Professor Henderson, “empirically verifiable statement about phenomena in terms of a conceptual scheme” (41).  Empiricism refers to the claim that “categories of a given theoretical system are by themselves adequate to explain all scientifically important facts” about the concrete phenomena considered (69-70).

THEORETICAL SYSTEM

The proper structure of a theoretical system may be stated as a single body of systematic theoretical reasoning traceable through a critical analysis.  Hence, we find that there is a “logical structure” for theory (7).  Therefore, a theoretical system must not simply observe facts and make logical conclusions.  If empirically correct, it must also be capable of allowing for prediction or tell, “what empirical facts it should be possible to observe in a given set of circumstances” (8).  This process requires at a minimum that the theorist take into consideration all relevant known facts that may be obtained and then investigate each to see if they agree with the theory.  After this, the theorist must verify those expectations of theory that appear to agree with the facts as presented.  This process is what makes the “system” of theoretical science.  Only in this way is it possible to simultaneously state what is currently known, allow questions to be formulated about what needs to be known, and then test alternatives and possible answers for answers.

            Facts, which are not yet connected with, or fail to be in relation with theory do not constitute “science” (16).  These residuals, are only bits and pieces of knowledge and are not to be confused with the positive theoretical system.  Theoretical systems must deal with empirically identifiable variables.  A goal of the scientific system is to eliminate from consideration the residual categories from science and focus upon the positively defined, empirical variables (19).  Only such a systematic theoretical study will allow science to progress.  This is a major distinction between science and philosophy.

Philosophy

Science and philosophy are not the same, but they may provide mutual benefits.  The example of Kant is illustrative (24).  Philosophy is a residual category because it is a mere attempt to rationalize cognitive understanding of the human experience in ways other than by empiric evidence (21).  A key concept to consider is that of methodology.  As a preface, consider that for each positive there is a negative (22).  For each scientific theory, there are philosophical consequences and other assumptions.  Good or bad, the duality exists.  Some questions will lead to valid knowledge through empirically valid propositions.  This process is methodology.  Methodology is narrowly defined as “considered general grounds for validity of scientific propositions” (24).  This definition is more than research technique through interview, questionnaire or statistical analysis.  Hence, methodology separates science from philosophy, which is based in logic and epistemology.  

Concepts

There are different types of theoretical concepts and type determines how the concept is formed (or perhaps framed) for scientific study.  The quote from Henderson illustrates this point well: “all empirical observation is ‘in terms of a conceptual scheme’” (28).  Language differences are good to provide an example of how structure of concepts differs.  Parsons calls these descriptive frames of reference or schemata (28).  These schemata represent a methodological level of scientific observation.  Of these, the schema of social action, proposing that concrete individuals adapt means of reaching ends is instrumental (30).  (This sounds like Weber’s rational action.)  To relate the earlier discussion, empirical facts must be considered within the schema or conceptualization.  Similar to Weber’s historical individual this process of using schema allows for phenomena of interest to be identified and defined within groups (conceptualized) and then studied meaningfully.  Concepts may then be referenced or broken down into parts for further examination.  The goal is to devise observational operations by which the scheme allows examination of empirical evidence and thereby allows problems to be answered (37 – 39).

            Therefore, a theoretical system must include a frame of reference, conceptualized structure of concrete systems to which the frame applies and certain “parts”.  The main aspect of the part is related to its structure in systems of action; the skeleton or social structure.  This analysis of social structure is therefore critically related to action schema, and as Parsons notes provides the name of the text The Structure of Social Action (39).

THEORY OF ACTION

Parsons’ theoretical systems for social science relies upon the finding that an action is a unit or part.  There must be an “actor”, the “end” of the act, and the “situation” which initiated the actor to act.  Note B on page 77 explores this concept in detail.  The situation may allow for control or lack of control over the act.  These may be called means or conditions respectively.  Further, the relationship between the parts may allow for normative alternatives.  Factors of the action are time, choice, actor’s subjective point of view, physical environment/ biological organism,    (45).  Time moves from present to future.  Without the actor doing something the future would not change.  By this process, actors ‘achieve, realize or achieve ends.  In this fashion, the system is its own atom.  Parsons later seems to use this for his basis in listing atomism as the first predominant feature of a developing system (56, 743).  Choice equates to “range of choice open to the actor”.  There is range of choice in the means of acting and in the ends of the future result as affected by the normative orientation.  Error is potential in this process because of error in choice.  The external world interplays upon the individual actor’s subjective state.  Hence, it is necessary to determine whether action is brought about by the external world or the actors’ internal point of view.  Physical environment may impinge upon the action.  As a final note, it is not the actor as an individual that is the atom, but rather the unit act that is the atom (72).

            In his discussion of utilitarianism Parsons notes that a major problem with social thinkers has been to justify (“values”) course of conduct or policy which they propose rather than evaluate objective and understandable facts (53).  He argues his point using primarily the ethical and religious contexts of Christianity and secondarily the cultural thought of the Greek polis (53-55).  The antithesis of the faulty objective to explain based upon value leads to the second predominate feature of a developing system, which is “rationality”.  This is not to be fully explained by a discussion of irrationality or nonrationality.  Rather the positive norm of rationality is action understood to be guided “by scientific or … scientifically sound knowledge of the circumstances of the actor” (58).  This translates to evaluation of what ends are possible within the conditions of the particular situation and then judging which means are reasonably understood and verified to be available and best adapted to meet the ends (the rational acting unit).  This unit (automism, rationality, empiricism, and random ends) allows for concrete empiricism and completes the utilitarian system.  Parsons notes that rationality also plays a role in the theory of action.  Unitarianism, positivism and idealism are synthesized into his theory of action. 

Voluntaristic Action

Action is voluntary and involves an actor, goals of individual actors, alternative means for achieving goals and desires, internal and external constraints that affect choice, and subjective decisions by the actors (60-69).  The utilitarian assigns a degree of rationality to the actor, therefore unitarianism may be said to be positivistic, but there are other positivist examples (62).  Positivist thought was central to Marshal, Pareto, and Durkheim.  

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Parsons concludes analysis with a reminder that he has attempted an empirical study.  It does not matter that the theories of the theorists considered dealt with various phenomena; rather these theorists were the empirical data by which the process of development of scientific thought has been studied.  A synthesis of concepts related to the utilitarian, positivist, and idealist leads to a “voluntaristic theory of action”.  By this theory enables the categorization of social phenomena.  From this theory, five particular theses have been concluded.

Five Theses

First, there is an outline or structure called the voluntaristic theory of action (62).  This is so even though different theorists examined used different terminology (720).  Second, these differing categories as a whole create a new system that although it includes parts of earlier systems fails to have all parts of any one system therefore it is individually incompatible with any prior system.  Third, as a whole the new system allows for understanding and explanation (closeness) of each earlier writer’s empirical views whether positivistic, evolutionary, utilitarian or idealistic.  Fourth, there remains much study to be done.  Hence, empirical study is ongoing (721).  Fifth, empirical study is a multifaceted process.  In order to better understand phenomenon there is need for a fully integrated systematic approach to study of empirical facts.  Without this approach, several fallacies arise as set forth on page 726. 

            The bottom line is that the development of empirical knowledge must be an integral part of measuring the development of social change.  This method is not simply of dominating importance to study of dynamics, but of major importance (726). 

Implications of the Study

Many things need to continue to be done.  The verification part of theory requires that scientists continue to test theory against empirical fact.  However, it is fair for scientists to set limits and parameters upon their work and identify the context of their study.  By defining the parameters of investigation a theorist may come to conclude his/her work and leave additional investigation and verification to other scientists (727).  The establishing of parameters of a study relates to the defining of the problem in the initial investigation.          Though attempting to limit the study to empiric evidence Parsons admits that he has had to rely in part upon philosophical considerations (728). 

             

 

Reference

Parsons, Talcott. [1937] 1961. The Structure of Social Action.  New York, NY: The Free Press of Glencoe.

Pareto’s Rise and Fall of Elites

Perhaps it is Vilfredo Pareto, from among early writers who have been labeled “classical social theorists, which best follows the method of first defining his social problem of interest, then stating propositions and only then constructing theories and hypotheses.  As he notes in Chapter 1 of The Rise and Fall of Elites, it is not his aim in writing to defend some concept or finding, but rather to objectively analyze social theory with facts (25).  As a result of his clarity of purpose and stated aim the reader is greatly enabled in following his analytical processes.  Moreover, Pareto is to the point in advising the reader to consider the text in specific contextual meaning and not to go beyond the limits of this text (25).  The Rise and Fall of Elites first written by Pareto under the untranslated title ______ is an excellent introduction to the basic theory of the “circulation of elites”.  In essence this proposal provides that the coming and going of elites during different eras of society are critical elements of societal progression. 

RATIONAL EXPLANATION OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR

Pareto follows the _____ reasoning process of Claude Bernard, whereby facts are noted, and thereby concepts are created.  It is from concepts that the scientist returns to an examination of objective fact (27).  Pareto informs the reader that he limits his analysis in “The Rise and Fall of Elites to examination of the concepts back to the facts (27).  He therefore jumps immediately into a discussion of his hypotheses or as elsewhere called laws.  Two hypotheses are as follows: 1) the greater sorts of human action arise not in logic but in sentiment, 2) In hindsight (a posteriori) humans try to justify actions arising in sentiment by assigning logical justification (27).  As this process plays out in the daily affairs of humankind most action is irrational and only afterward due to certain stimuli humans attempt to give rational justification to those actions.  The discussion of Themistocles defeat of the Persian fleet, ten times the size of the Athenian fleet at Salamis, in the Aegean Sea is a prime example of a posteriori justification (29). 

            Pareto concludes that from the two prior propositional laws that “every sociological phenomenon has two distinct and entirely diverse forms”, to wit: the subjective and the objective form (27).  Accordingly, the psychological state of belief is the subjective form and the objective state relates to the real interchange between objects.  Again his use of an example, the fun house mirror, brings clarity to his conceptualization.

            In getting a firm basic understanding of Pareto’s theory it seems most important to understand that human consciousness reflects (like a mirror) objective reality.  In essence, examination of the objective leads to understand the subjective.  None the less, in understanding the roles of both subjective and objective forms it is important not to discount either.  Rather it is a blend of both subjective and objective states that creates the better understanding of action.  Pareto rejects Darwin because Darwinianism suggests that forms that do not “fit” suffer demise.  In the interaction of objective and subjective basis for action neither form is eliminated.  Within this blending of subjective and objective is the answer to why or how their mutual relation plays out (29).  From hindsight history allows society to look back and see how actions based upon subjective sentiment play out and in so doing filled with greater objectivity bring fuller understanding of action.  Perhaps it can be said that in the present, the actors are too close and engrossed with the phenomena to fully appreciate the action taken.  Could the “war on terror” which some how led to the removal of Saddam Hussein from his seat of power in Iraq be form of globalized struggle of elites?  Could the sentiment of fear caused by 9-11 combined with religious zeal have bonded a people to irrationality?  If so, in a time of more rational evaluation would the U.S. now be continuing the struggle in Iraq? 

            In moving forward to the concept of the law of rhythm Pareto introduces the reader to a major assumption that he makes in this text (34).  Specifically he points out that the makes an assumption that “there is a rhythm of sentiment which we can observe in ethics, in religion, and in politics as waves resembling the business cycle” (31).  Pareto gives reference to Spencer’s law of motion (30).  These currents or waves of motion or movement may be accompanied by substantive interaction with ethics, religion, politics or other forms of sentiment.  These waves ebb and waine, they are turbulent and stagnate, but their flows create a “faith” or “skepticism” in groups of society.  This faith or skepticism binds with law number two regarding a posteriori logical justification for actions taken and create “strange imagination” about reality.  These strange imaginations provide the irrational justification for action.  In the process of justifying prior action both the actors and the masses come to see the justification as the actor’s true motive for the act completed.  For example anger may lead to assault and capture, which is justified as protection and thereby fear or hatred combined with a rhythmatic force such as patriotism or religion is seen as the justification.   In short people act because they get caught up knowingly or unknowingly in currents that lead to the impulse or irrational action.  After completing the act imaginary or devised reasons are constructed to justify the act.  Most all people, but the actors and the masses come to accept the justification as truth.

CIRCULATION OF ELITES

Elites are those people represent the strongest , most energetic, and most capable citizenry in concept.  They are part of every society and era of time and may be evil or good.  Pareto notes that elites come and go.  In this way as previous elites are removed new elites are being brought into the circle.  In the end the elite as a model of power and influence remains the same as in previous eras (36).  Pareto explains this continual process as follows.  Elites make major contribution to stability and continuance of society.  Each era, new outsiders with to come to power.  In their effort to enter the circle of the old elites they may establish and objective to only join the circle or they may determine to remove the old circle members.  In the ideal form these “want to be’s” sponsor the good of the oppressed and frail masses and declare the good of all or most of the society.  This provides support to their subjective cause to join the circle with an objective cause on behalf of the masses.  An example of the objective effort may be the use of boycotts, or sponsoring laws for general health care.  If successful, the new elites begin to take on the same role of the old elites and the masses are controlled, forgotten, or given concessions in order to manage solidarity of the society.  Could this also play out as a dream to bring Democracy to a part of the world that has historically denounced the concept?  Figure 1. below provides a flow chart of elite circulation.

Growing Sentiment		=	Growing Period of Crisis
Rise of New Elites (under class)		+ = -	Decline of Old Elite
Mode:	sponsor needs of society		Mode:	a.       some may be retained b.      all may be removed
	once in power =	perpetuates the power, but appear to vindicate the weak, perhaps with grants and necessary concessions

 

ASSENDING PERIOD – RELIGIOUS CRISIS

Religious sentiment is a commonly associated with

CONCLUSION

.

 

Reference

Pareto, Vilfredo. [___] 2008. The Rise and Fall of Elites: An Application of Theoretical Sociology.  Translated by ____; with an Introduction by Hans L. Zetterberg. New Brunswick, NJ:Transaction Publishers.

Marx – Engels: German Ideology & The Manifesto

The evolution of socioeconomic systems naturally creates tension and in turn struggle.  The appropriate question may center on which type of dimension struggle erupts.  Is struggle centered upon class, race, gender, or perhaps another universal construct?  Can it be that class struggle is the optimum form of tension and that gender and race are only factors that may enhance or detract from the causal effect of class?  No doubt, tension and struggle do lead to a “sorting out” of differences, ways and those who seek power to “call the shots” of which the remainder of society must either abide by or seek to continue to frustrate or overturn.

            These tensions and struggles Marx would say have led to the ordered evolution of society from the primitive toward the civilized.

GERMAN IDEOLOGY

In his manuscript published as The German Ideology Marx with exactness, picks apart the theoretical concepts of young Hegelians such as Saint Bruno and Saint Max as he refers to them.  In Volume 1 he gives further great attention to the writings of Feuerbach.  Marx laboriously and with continual exactness emphasizes the role of the history of man, or perhaps better stated he explains his concept and theory of how history comes to be accounted for, and explains the cause and effect relationship that defines history as understood in each social age.  Within this context, Marx addresses the materialist’s conception of history as based upon certain “real premises” which are set forth for the reader beginning at page 36 and following.  The first premise, Marx tells the reader is that “all human history is…the existence of living human individuals” (37).

History

Human history began in its primitive stage as a tribal communal system.  Over time it evolved through stages which he calls ancient and feudal (38).  To these there he later adds the industrial or capitalistic age in which at his writing was in flux and debatably continues today even though there is current argument for a post-industrial world or an information society.  In the industrial age property and division of labor are uniquely tied together in establishing power groups and determining who, how, and when power is allocated.  Other transitional stages may be discussed such as the age of migration of tribal individuals to the town which led to the establishment of the guild/artisan system which matured in the feudal age.  Another transition is the migration of individuals from guildsmen and artisans to the merchant class and thereby led to manufacturing not only in towns but between towns.  In the progressive growth of manufacturing towns began to trade with other town.  Merchants connected towns and manufacturers. 

Division of labor.  Some towns became known for their products and manufacture.  Eventually this matured to states and countries trading with each other and led to some being know as primary manufacturers of certain properties.  This came to establish the division of labor and the formation of a capitalist society in which the bourgeois exercise power over the proletariat.  In other words society builds upon itself and productive people advance society (41).  As society grows more production is required, and what humans produce will dictate what humankind is; the mode of life (37).

            Within Marx’s concept society would advance further because of the above statements.  The need to exist creates in humans certain needs, food, housing, and clothes, etc.  Hence, production to create these needs occurs.  Without production there is no existence.  Hence, production is essence of human existence.  Marx lists three aspects regarding human existence (47,48).  All three co-exist in society and help the process of production.

            This process works together in the capitalist society whereby production is defined as division of labor.  Division of labor brings with it fragmentation (95).  A by-product is opposition, which may be classified perhaps as a type of competition.   This division of labor lends itself to development of private property and the state.  As people compete and specialized manufacturers come to exist there is also established an irony.  The irony is that mutual interdependence comes into play (49-52).

Production defines humankind.  Those in power are the ruling class and those that control material production also control intellectual production or ideas (67).  Hence, those with power shape the history of ideas for that particular age of humankind.  In this way the capitalist through production comes to regulate society.  Therefore, production regulates individuals and human history.  Production dictates the definition of humankind.  This is not as it should naturally be.  Humans were initially communal in the tribe.  What is called for is a return to the communal; the perfection of communism.  The communist human is distinguished from the capitalist.  The opposite cause effect relationship exists between the communist and capitalist society.  In the communist society humans (society) regulates production (53).

FUTURE ORDER

            From this point it is capable to predict the future of society and human history yet to be.  Marx states that in the capitalist social individuals ultimately become estranged.  This state of humanity must revolt in order to overcome being estranged.   But this can only be successful in a universal revolt.  Sporatic and isolated revolution will not  be successful.  Before such a revolution will be successful there must be widespread subjugation to “unendurable power” which has created in the majority of people a state of “propertylessness” (54).  Only will this universal revolt abolish the present state of humankind.  In this way revolution will end private ownership of property and division of labor and hence will end the power structure that in the capitalist system controls both the material production and the intellectual production of property.  Marx at page 71 makes a good argument and analysis of this point in the natural vs. the created instrument of production. 

INTERESTING OBSERVATIONS

Though it will not be discussed in this paper Marx’s analysis of the material and mental labor, the migrations from country-side to city and then to the establishment of the merchant class and capitalism is most interesting (75-83).  His analysis of the weakness of the unorganized groups of migrants leading to capitalism and power through division of labor and property is quite interesting.  Communism to Marx is the ultimate (89,90).

THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO

The Communist Manifesto serves to put into succinct terminology the further developed concepts which Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels premised in The German Ideology.  Important concepts relate to class struggle leading to conflict and the resolution in the form of a new type of revolution or a pure revolution that will end property ownership and the need for class.  Essentially what makes this a pure revolution is that unlike in the past in which revolt established only a reform or reclassification of property this pure revolution will be a reform of society without property.

HISTORY OF STRUGGLE

The history of mankind is the history of class struggle (Marx and Engels 1906:2).  In this way Marx digresses to the basic concepts of the stages of society that he before established in The German Ideology.  However, in The Communist Manifesto he elaborates greatly on a more developed concept of the widening void between the Bourgeoisie and the Proletariat ( ).  Relevant sections to compare this analysis are set forth in The German Ideology (Marx 1998:38-83).  In developing the line of argument Marx makes several primary points regarding the relationship of the Bourgeoisie and the Proletariat, the complementary function between the Proletariat and communism, the later role of socialism, and opponents to communism.

Laborer and Communism.

It seems that Marx says is asking the reader a question.  The question may be stated as who do you labor for?  He may say for the capitalist or for the laborer.  In the capitalist system the answer is that the laborer labors for the sake of labor.  In the communist system the laborer labors for the laborer.

            The Bourgeoisie and Proletariat will inevitably clash.  Society is an order of diametric scheme in the form of oppressed and oppressor (Marx and Engels 1906:2).   This is nothing new, however it must be understood that this form of antagonism between classes is ever growing and will erupt.  This growing change is the result of numerous revolutions in the form of modes of production and exchange.  As each age develops the modes of production and exchange have lead to the greater influence or power of the propertied Bourgeoise and less influence of the propertyless Proletariat. 

            Marx evidences to the reader that the Bourgeoise as it has gained power and property has been the spear point for these revolutions which have only led to greater centralization of power in themselves and reduction of the value of the laborer to that of his wage, a money relationship (1906:3).  As such, the conditions of production and exchange have evolved and created an ever increasing burst circular growth of the Bourgeoisie, which has become world dominating (Marx and Engels 1906:5).  Comically imaginative is the picture Marx paints of the sorcerer who has created more than he/she can handle and finds that the creation is in control of the creator.  Likewise, the global growth of production and exchange has now outgrown the control of the Bourgeois society and it will be their downfall at the behest of the Proletariat.    

            The Proletariat and communism roles, a call to arms.  Within this section is the inspiration for and the defense of the revolution.  Marx gives the reader insight in how to implement the revolution.  In addition, perhaps of greater importance he attempts to answer the objections that appear against the revolution.  In particular, he lends support to why a propertyless society is practicable and necessary.  He also sets forth reasons for why economics call for revolution regardless the strength of religion.  While these two arguments appear rational, his arguments regarding family and nationality seem slimly supported.

            Other socialists fail to see the absolute outcome through revolution.  Marx addresses three major types of then modern socialists, the reactionary, the conservative and the Critical.  Each of these Marx dispels with argument regarding their fallacies, inept understanding, or corrupt premises.

            Other opponents.  Keep the goal in mind Marx leads the reader.  This is his final call to rally.  He seems to say read everything said thus far and now put it to action.  The reader is not the only one that will act but rather all communists everywhere will support this revolt.  It is inevitable and it is sure to succeed.

CRITICAL NOTE ON MARX AND ENGELS

Apparently all social change is based upon economics.  They seem to give very little credit to change being initiated through religion or individual humans.  However, in particular The Communist Manifesto must be read for what it is; as an inspiring document drafted for purpose to propagandize a particular mode of change during a particular era of history.  In this it does an excellent job of cutting to the point and inspiring readers to “act”. 

CONCLUSION

In review of the above and after return to a few select pages from the German Ideology and the German Manifesto it is most aptly stated that Marx became a cynic of what became the new interpretation of Hegel’s concepts as set forth by the young Hegelians.  He also concluded that power is rooted in property and division of labor, which is to say in land, money and manufacturing. 

Reference

Marx, Karl. 1998. The German Ideology. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1906. Manifesto of the Communist Party. Chicago, IL: Charles H. Kerr & Company.