Herbert Spencer and Social Statics

When initially beginning this week’s reading it became evident that the incorrect book had been obtained, to wit: Social Statics: Abridged and Revised; Together with The Man versus The State (Spencer 1892).  This work was originally published in 1851 as Social Statics: or, the Conditions essential to Human Happiness specified, and the first of them developed (Spencer 1892:3).  Following the production of the third edition and expanded sales in America Spencer concluded that parts of the original work was both outdated by organizational and institutional changes as well as in need of further qualification.  Moreover, Spencer came to a better understanding of his work and realized that certain portions needed modification and/or change.  Almost forty years after the original publication Spencer modified his work, adding Part IV of The Principle of Ethics – Justice and giving particular qualification to other principles of the work.

            In an effort to better understand Spencer’s discussion of the organic social and social evolution of society an effort was made to look at the revised volume.  Nevertheless, the primary reading comes from the first edition of Social Statics: or, the Conditions essential to Human Happiness specified, and the first of them developed (Spencer 1851).

HAPPINESS OF HUMANKIND

Happiness is a definition of the individual.  Government is an institution, constructed of various organizations that propose and implement policy and law which effect individual behavior.  Hence, government is an outside force, which by its formation and operation both indirectly and directly interferes with individual human happiness.  Spencer’s statement and later examples regarding attempts to manage idealist happiness going awry seem to support his proposition that the individual should largely be independent of government (Spencer 1851:8-10).  The various examples he delivers to support his point are noteworthy.  Examples such as the attempt to end the slave trade, to end marriage between impoverished people, and establishing a minimum wage paint a vivid picture of government’s unhappy guesses and unsuccessful attempts to fix happiness through a maximization of laws and regulations (Spencer 1851:10).

            In addressing the failure of government to legislate control and happiness

Spencer gives three fallacies of government, they are 1. faulty as indicated above by example, 2. incapable of legislating happiness because happiness is an individual determination of each person, 3. not eternal, but rather a transitory necessary evil to be endured until society matures beyond a lower state of morality (1851:13,14).  Spencer’s statement in which he elucidates about each new term of parliament passing new laws that are appropriately entitled “An Act to Amend…” is hilarious, but for the fact that the scenario is accurate.  By comparison, to our own times his statement is a timeless statement (1851:11).   His statement of expediency, or perhaps better referred to as his question is “what is best for the greatest number of people”.  Government may offer expediency, however it is not in reality the best for all.  True, in an ideal sense social law may be best for a proportion, but can the greatest number of humankind be happy in the real sense by regulation?

            In reflecting on the above, a question comes to mind.  Can morality be governed?  Spencer says humanity is the highest conceivable level of perfection (1851:15).  In other words, society has not culminated to the highest level yet, so in its imperfection it seeks to establish moral precepts and behavior leading to order and happiness through central government as the most ideally expedient modus operandi.  This is not good because government is ironically made up of humans in their imperfect state; hence, government is imperfect albeit perhaps necessary as the best current alternative for happiness and order.  In time, will society evolve and no longer need government?  Spencer seems to say yes, because of the natural laws of nature.  This seems similar to Comte, however not the same.  Comte saw social order maximized in law and government of the whole organism.  Spencer seems to say that as society progresses less government is better government.  In essence, society is best understood in relation to the individual not the whole.

MORAL SENSE AND MORAL CODE

Is it futile to attempt to construct a moral philosophy of right and wrong?  Is there a definite rule of right or reality hidden within the uncertain, unique and capricious human element?  True, this is a weakness of humankind.  However, this weakness is not detrimental to the individual being of primary value in establishing order in society.  To explain this Spencer relates a discussion of logic (1851:29,30).  Certain truths (axioms) allow the establishment of certain basic principles upon which people all think alike.  Although Spencer draws an analogy between primary laws of quantity and mathematics and the moral sense to moral axiom his meaning is unclear at this point.  Perhaps he is establishing a natural law as part of his proposition. 

            Much thanks to Mr. Spencer for briefly reviewing the argument of a universal physical and ethical law  periodically, this allows better reflection upon his thought process(1851:50, 51).  He makes a quantum leap in his assumption, however provided the reader could imagine that leap he argues his point well.  In so making this statement he brings us back full circle to his discussion of the fallacy in seeking expediency.

PERFECTION OF MAN

Morality

Spencer repeats several statements regarding the perfection of humankind in relation to its moral code.  First, humanity is the highest conceivable level of perfection, second, society has not culminated to the highest level yet, and third, the moral law must be the law of the perfect man (1851:15, 55).  He also makes a conclusion that morality is a code of rules for behavior of man; it either recognizes man’s imperfection and makes allowances, or it is based upon man in his perfect state (Spencer 1851:55).  In so coming to this conclusion it is evident that in his mind that a code of morality must be based upon the idyllic concept of the perfection of man, rather than the realistic state of humankind.  In this way, the science of social life is alike to the other sciences.  Consistent is the argument that expediency creates a pool of turbulence in the social order.

Evil

Spencer begins that “all evil results from, the non-adaptation of constitution to conditions” (1851:59).  This statement remained unclear and mystical for a great deal of this reading.  Ultimately, it appears that what he is relating is the natural order of the social and the environment.  Though he does not use this exact terminology, it appears he is saying that the disturbance of the social equilibrium leads to disorder and disorder brings ill effect to conditions of the social.  Inevitably, the system is capable of adaptation and as such heals itself.  This in turn is an example of universal law and order.

            In furthering his position Spencer expands upon human adaptation (perhaps it could be called social evolution) and poses the question as to why man is unsuited to the current social environment (1851:63).  Here he almost sounds as if he is implying that the human exhibits biological instinct and it is this “hold over” instinct from predatory times that causes man not to be able to function well and fully adapt to the current social state.  There is in effect a cultural lag in man’s social adaptation and this lag transcends time and will do so for an unforeseeable future, but will eventually lead to human perfection.  This is in effect his point in explaining his universal law of perfection.  He lists six points to illuminate this precept (Spencer 1851:64).  This is progress, that over time imperfection will disappear.  Spencer admits later that this evolution is a slow process that is fraught with obstacles (1851:414).  In other words, there is a battle between social advancement of natural law and social morality against the reality of humankind’s world in which human against human and beast struggle for dominance.  His example of the wildflower seed and the plight of the human existence are well taken in the context presented (1851:415).  In his six-point analysis, the use of faculties causes them to modify and grow and disuse will bring their loss.  This part of Spencer’s argument seems weak, primarily because of his specific examples in the paragraphs that follow in the text, to wit: the laborer’s hand grows thick, the blacksmith’s arm large and the sailor’s eye long-sighted.  Yes, use does lend itself to development, but not in the degree that Spencer seems to want the reader to believe.  Perhaps he is speaking in the ideal rather than the real.   It is the advancement to perfection that Spencer later defines as social dynamics (1851:409).

Survival of the fittest?

In reading Part IV, it almost seems that Spencer is proposing a concept of survival of the fittest in explaining how humankind must, if it remains in its existent state, be conquered (1851:416).  The individual is supreme, perfect in concept and maturity, but yet immature, ever changing, modifying, clarifying and eventually evolving into the model perfection consistent with science in general.  It is consistent that groups of people do not all progress at the same speed.  What is important is that the order of the people remains in its natural state.  Accordingly, if some groups are disproportionately behind another group in maturity to perfection they may be subordinated or taken advantage of by those groups that continue to progress.  In keeping with his precept selection of the fittest leads to natural progression of humankind.

STATE DUTY LIMITATIONS

The premise here is that each organ has its own function.  The physical organ tends to its own particular function.  The social organ in turn tends to its own function.  An organ functions well within its defined realm and does not function outside of its realm.  Hence, as the heart or lungs, social organs such as government must stay within its respective defined realm.  Spencer again will analogize this, but what he says is that government and other social institutions are specially adapted to particular means and ends and must remain segregated to those means and ends (1851:275).  Not only should the populous not invite government to take on new additional functions, but also government should be proactive to refuse additional functions.  Government is in effect a voluntary association for the purpose of protection.  Beyond this basic duty the goals and functions become germs for schisms between groups such as party affiliation, for example the Democrat and the Republican.  This schism in turn detracts from or weakens the function to protect.  The debate between the parliamentarian and the citizen on page 277 is a very strong point to support the concept Spencer proposes.  This is much like the acceptance of federal aid by school districts for the purchase of books.  Once money is accepted, certain books are eliminated from the purchase list.

            Accordingly, the government that goes beyond its limited role hinders and actually retards social growth and progress.  Spencer mentions several special areas of concern in which government oversteps its limits.  These are trade and commerce, religious establishment, welfare or poor laws, national education, governmental colonialism, sanitary supervision and several miscellaneous interferences including currency and the postal system.

            He concisely addresses the opposition that the aggression of government is beneficial because with one restriction upon the populous comes a benefit that would not otherwise be accessible to the public (Spencer 1851:279).  In essence, he responds that government can create no new provision for the public rather all government can do is redistribute what is already in existence.  Thus in reality the public only loses.

CONCLUSION

In turning to consider the cumulative effect of Herbert Spencer, it must be concluded that his course was to satisfactorily explain the social state by universal principles.  In so explaining the concept, the individual is supreme, perfect in design and will be perfect in maturity.  However, human societies are not yet mature.  But consistent with his conclusion the social is ever changing, modifying, clarifying and eventually to evolve into perfection consistent with science in general.  It is therefore, consistent that groups of people do not all progress at the same speed.  What is important is that the order of the people remains in its natural state.  Accordingly, if some groups are disproportionately behind another group in the order of maturity they may be subordinated or taken advantage of by those groups that advance.  Since it is the human organism that determines use and non-use of faculties, it is hence the ultimate concept of the social to remain in control without outside influence such as government and law.  These external expediencies only lead to corruption and evil and therefore interfere with social evolution.  In short, humankind left to its own method and speed of progression complements and preserves the natural and effective order of society.

            What an enjoyable writing style.  The various dialogs carried on between characters add a dimension of realism and helps to draw the reader into the scenario as presented.  Perhaps this is why this work sold so many copies in America. 

Reference

Spencer, Herbert. 1851. Social Statics: or, the Conditions essential to Human Happiness specified, and the first of them developed. London, UK:John Chapman. Retrieved September 5, 2008 (http://books.google.com/books?id=cR4RAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover#PPP12,M1).

——. 1892. Social Statics: Together With Man versus The State. London, UK: D. Appleton and Company.

Father of Sociology

How refreshing to read Lenzer’s translation of Comte’s original work.  While driving back and forth from Arkansas to Denton once a week there is a great deal of time to reflect on classes attended and conversely attempt to project what will be covered in each upcoming class.  One thing that comes to mind this week is my experiences almost 22 years ago when I began my studies in sociology at Sam Houston State University in Huntsville, Texas.  In considering my experience, which seemed at first so remote, it quickly became quite apparent that my experience had been much like that referred to by Lenzer in her introduction to Comte and Positivism: The Essential Writings (xxxi).

It seems that many of the classical theorists are no longer widely read as primary materials.  Rather, as in my educational experience to this point, secondary books and articles have replaced the theorist’s original writings.  In reading Comte, although translated, the opportunity is presented to bond with and given the interest to do so, to meld with him and his thoughts.  Perhaps our historical approach to the many theorists, especially the classic, hinders the student’s ability to expand upon and interpret the original thought fully.  For instance, many books abound that tend to group theorists and give a universal nutshell statement of their theory and reasoning.  In doing so, much of the individuality of the theorist is lost or at minimum made obscure and difficult to determine.  In this way, the intellectual works of the theorist are subdued and sterilized.  In short, they are often not as pleasant to read and lose feeling.  Perhaps to require more reading of original works will allow students of the social science to explore concepts in their own unique ways and bring about new and diverse ways to explain age old social intercourse.  For instance, in reading Comte it is easy to see his frustration with the world of his age.  No doubt, his childhood was filled with first hand accounts of the Bastille and the revolution, the streets of blood and even nostalgic recollections of Louis XVI.  He had experienced the coming of Napoleon and the ages of war and capitulation.  This is insightful in seeking to understand Comte and his eventual revelation that matures in relation to religion and altruistic social interaction.

THE FIRST SYSTEM

Nature and Importance of Positive Philosophy

Comte states two purposes in his work (77).  The first is to firmly establish the science of sociology.  The second is perhaps an offensive movement to draw a comparison to study of the social and that, like the natural sciences, is a true science. 

Comte seemingly seeks explanation of an ordered society through a circle of explanation (71).  Society must be explained as a whole, as a history of events that moves through stages of progress.  History plays an integral role in social understanding, and society moves through three stages; theological, metaphysical and positive or scientific.  The theological is based in belief and seeks origin and purpose in relation to supernatural beings.  The metaphysical is a state of transition and phenomena of the society is created by the abstract nature of the mind.  The third stage is the positive in which laws of relation, perhaps cause and effect, are studied.  Reasoning and observation create knowledge.  This appears to be saying that single phenomena may be used to establish general facts.  If so, this may be similarly compared to quantitative research (72). 

            It is interesting how Comte builds his stages and eventually the predominance of sociology as the high science (74).  In doing so he seems to interweave his premise that each stage is separate yet bearing marks of the previous stage(s)(72).  Comte hinges his conclusion upon the development of the study of principal categories of phenomena, physiological and social being the last.  Hence, in the hierarchy of all science the social science is the culmination.  The reason being that social is the most individual, complicated and dependent upon the others.  Accordingly, each of the previous four categories advance from the least individual, uncomplicated and independent to the opposite spectrum (76).   The hierarchy being complete there will be universal understanding.  Not that all answers are found but advancement is complete and affected only by new knowledge.  Ironically, Comte’s statement regarding the four earlier sciences being subject only to historical existence is a memorable statement as pointed out by Lenzer in her introduction (xxxi).  In making a further observation along this line, Comte describes the advancement of new science.  He states that science goes through stages.  A new science develops by analyzing in relation to its past in historical sequence before it can begin to analyze and theorize dogmatically.  His statement “a modern geometer commonly finishes his education without having read a single original work dating further back than the most recent discoveries” resonates upon our current study of classical theory (91, 92).   

            Comte’s vision is for the call for a new student of the social to connect with all divisions of the sciences in unity and to seek betterment of the whole society (78-79).  This call to arms so to speak is quite inspiring.  This vision of progress leads directly into his establishment of four primary advantages that follow this evolution in society, these are: 1) to establish rationality through logical laws of the human mind, 2) to regenerate education; that is to say that all general instruction must be based upon positive or scientific philosophy and analysis, 3) unity in sciences, and 4) creation of a homogenous doctrine.

Hierarchy of Positive Sciences

“From science comes prevision; from prevision comes action” (88).  Comte seems to say that sciences must come to full development before a fully functioning ability to visualize can be fulfilled.   Sociology or positivism is the fulfillment of the sciences and therefore previsions or theory may be most fully realized.  From this comes action and progress.  This seems to relate to his discussion of the social static.  Once society begins to speculate it can begin to concern itself with explanation of theoretical abstract science (90, 91).  Having made this statement Comte explains the hierarchy of the sciences, which is introduced in chapter 1 (74).

            It is important to note that Comte promotes the concept that historical analysis plays an important role in development of science, but society must grow beyond mere learning of historical concepts of science and begin to experience anew.  Learning from what others teach is good, but it is more advantageous to learn what the several sciences have established and move on to invent; the dogmatic method.  This progresses in a natural and necessary fashion from study of simple and general phenomena to the more complex and particular phenomena.  This change is the social dynamic.  The simple and general are most removed from the sphere of man (93).  This enhances the social science as being the top of the hierarchy.  Within this progression of science the simple are the inorganic and move upward in organization to the organic.  Similarly are the celestial (astronomy) and the terrestrial (physics).

Social Physics – A Positive Science of Society

Correct and discerning methodology is the significant component of the study of social life.  Methodical study of the social may lead to many questions and ultimate theory which may be later tested.  An important factor in scientific study is whether it is accurate to study the specific parts to generalize about the whole, or rather examine the whole in order to understand the units, which make it up?  Likewise Comte seems to ask whether lasting order to society can come without progress, or whether progress can come without order?  In analyzing these questions, Comte turns to the discussion of the static and dynamic.  Order equates to the social static.  Progress equates to dynamics of the social.  Questions arise.  How is order maintained?  How do order and progress complement each other?  At this point, Comte seems earnestly to begin to call for organization in society and it becomes very clear that much of his quest is to bring order to a world in turmoil (388). 

            Social Statics and Social Dynamics introduced.  In the study of order (static) and progress (dynamic) of social condition, it is important to understand the complementary nature of the two.  The static provides a study of order.  It is a necessity to study the order of society, that is to say its actions and reactions.  Through this movement, it is possible to see how the social gradually modifies itself (224).  However, the multitude of segmental actions and reactions best viewed and studied in light of the whole society.  This is because society is organized and complex, that is to say organic.  Hence, comparison is to the inorganic.  Inorganic is the lower order in the hierarchy of science.  Accordingly, Comte is saying that inorganic science is less complex than the organic (94).  Therefore, the study of the inorganic is suited to study of the parts, which can then give generalizations about the whole (229).  This conclusion is not the case with the study of society.  Society is complex and better analyzed in its overall scheme. 

            In elaborating on the laws and conditions of the static Comte relies on his view of the historical development of humanity upon the analysis of the individual and the family in relation to the overall society.  Comte’s indication that the family is the critical base structure or unit of society is consistent with a society created of groups (267).  His argument that individuals are hampered by personal needs, desires, and instincts which lead to ultimate deviance or “individual divergences” is interesting and seems to correlate with the need for government and law (273). 

            In reflecting upon instant life experiences in relation to the discussion of the family, individuals and the expose on women, light more clearly shines on the personal educational past.  In the 1970’s at Sam Houston State, many classes were attended which were taught by a particular professor of sociology.  This professor often referred to Comte in his discussions and lectures.  This professor also had a dark blue tie that was part of his regular professional attire.  The tie, covered with little pink pigs often seemed to inspire him to elaborate on his social views of women.  He referred to it as his “male chauvinist pig tie” and always with a very smug air of self-efficacy.  Unfortunately, educational readings on social theory at that point in time, including the writings of Comte were of the secondary sources.  This failed to lend full appreciation to the many theorists and in particular left out much of the social analysis behind the professor’s social views.  Having now read Comte’s discussion of the role of women and men, there is a much better understanding of Comte.  And, admittedly there is a better understanding of the long ago tie scenario.  The professor no doubt held Comte in very high esteem in this venue.  Comte proposes interesting theoretical discussion regarding family and the relationship it has to the social whole on pages 267-270.  It is possible that the affinity developed between husband and wife in the “ideal” family unit would be consistent with his discussion of a domestic connection and union (271).  However, the ideal and the real often are inconsistent.  This seems to be a weakness in his argument for order of society, although from a theoretical perspective it is very functional and supportive of his thesis.  Likewise, it is logical that his view of hierarchal subordination for progeny may be debated (269).

            Having personally studied law for a number of years and practiced for eighteen years, Comte’s discussion of the social division of employment and how it provides a means to organize individuals into useful tasks that benefit the general good of society is very fascinating.  Laws do provide an element of discipline when individuals and groups deviate or diverge as he puts it (272-273).  Perhaps this is a prime example of the nature of “action” and “reaction”.

            Why does government work most of the time?  Is it that most people prefer to be followers?  Do most prefer to obey rather than command?  If so, this does seem to explain order. 

Order of society is critical however, the mode of progression is also critical.  At this point, it is interesting to note how Comte explains the dynamic (229).  Society has continuity.  It rests upon a succession of “social states” that may predict order (230).  Therefore, what Comte is saying is that there is a natural relationship for society.  This complements the developmental stages of society from theological to metaphysical to positivism.  For instance, the concept of dynamics is that society advances in an upward, advanced flow.  The rate of this flow or how quickly progression occurs is regulated by many factors some of which are the growth of the population both local and worldwide as well as the fact that humans are not perfect and they must perfect each advancement before moving on to the next (280-81).  In application for instance, the human mind at first could interpret and explain minimally and theological explanation was sufficient.  Time to master and learn brought advancement to reason.  Observations and past historical accounts lead to the metaphysical and so on to the higher level of positivism.  Human development to each stage allows for division of labor and specialization.   

THE SECOND SYSTEM

Social Statics

Order and stability seems to be the outcome or vision of Comte.  Through this new science, the positivism of sociology will be as a religion, perhaps to replace all religion.  In reading pages 396 and forward, it appears that Comte comes about in a circular fashion to the basics of the theological.  Not that he bases societal understanding on divine but rather as society travels through the three stages (theological, metaphysical and scientific) it culminates in a stage governed by a new law; this time not religion, but by science, a society maintained by love not faith (397).  In essence, he seems to propose a religion of science; of order and progress.  Perhaps he proposes a utopian dream, but no less his premise is an admirable proposition for the social evolution of humanity.  

            Comte seems to be saying that everything is relative to the whole or the world about us.  Everything continues progressively as does human understanding.  Religion provides a means to harmony, both within and without, both internal and external.  Reason completes this harmony.  Harmony and reason combine to make the importance of the whole (the world) more important than the individual does.  These two elements are much like the great being of the theological stage. 

            In liking physical productions roll to social harmony Comte indicates that production and preservation of goods (things that all people want) is critical to transmission of those physical goods to society.  In this people develop desire to supply others.  This seems to be at the heart of Comte’s desire for love and a positive social science (406).  Without adequate supply, that is a result of production and preservation, there would be selfishness.  Selfishness could be an independent variable for revolution and the problems Comte so evidently wishes to end.  In discussing altruism of the specialist worker who creates his/her special product under the system of “division of labor” there seems to ring a bell for several contemporary theorists and economists.  For example, the comments by Daniel Bell in his writings about the postindustrial society and the educated professional that will work for the utopian good of all humankind, or even the similar observations of Robert Reich, exemplify the maturity of Comte’s altruistic society. (298). 

CONCLUSION

In reading Comte, a new appreciation for him has developed.  Often those who seek to explain the world and society and chart new paths for exploration are fraught with competition and saboteurs.  Comte’s intense belief in his proposal is evident in his painstaking analysis and comparison of the then established sciences and their methodologies to that of his proposed positivism of the social.

            This reading has provided a better understanding of the man Auguste Comte and the circumstances in which he writes.  With the ability to consider his prefaces and transitional materials it is more self evident of his analysis and his goal to provide a means to analyze and perhaps allow for directing society toward a dimension of order, love and ultimate progression to higher levels of humanity.

            Through this exercise I have been provided and have gained a new and at other times renewed appreciation of reading of the classics.  For without the classics what would we call the contemporary?  In essence, without the classics what would be the contemporary view?  Much like the house without the foundation, if we had not the pioneers we would have no base upon which to build and progress.  In essence, Comte ironically provides the “order” upon which the following eras of theory “progress”.

Reference

Lenzer, Gertrud, ed. 1988. Auguste Comte and Positivism: The Essential Writings. New Brunswick,: Transaction Publishers.

Note on Consequences of Modernity

Notes:  “The Contours of High Modernity”[1]

 

Obviously Giddens rejects that we have moved from a modern society to a post-modern or informational society.  Rather he promotes that we are still in the modern age perhaps a “high modern society”.  Giddens takes no small amount of time to discuss three conceptions regarding society and modernity.  These three concepts are “institutional diagnosis of modernity”, “society as the primary focus of sociological analysis”, and “the connections between sociological knowledge and the characteristics of modernity” (10, 11).  Then proposes that in order to understand what makes modernity what it is we must not follow these concepts (16).

 

Rather Giddens says that what makes modernity what it is relates to three other “sources”: Modernity and ‘time and space’; ‘disembedding’ of social systems; and ‘reflexive ordering and reordering’ of social relations” (17). 

 

Time & Space.  Both pre-modern and modern society have time and space.  With modernity became uniform and in the last decades has become coordinated.  Space used to be closely connected with place, such as the act of going to work meant traveling from home to the office or company.  Once there you were in the place fulfilling your function (space) at a given time.  In the current age (ICTs) technology has enabled us to disjoin space and place.  As Giddens mentions “advent of modernity increasingly tears space away from place by fostering relations between ‘absent’ others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction…. it becomes increasingly phantasmagoric” the society is enabled to be socialized through sometimes quite distant points (19).  This “distanciation” seems to me to relate to a concept of “virtual” reality which we have discussed earlier.  Much like telework, telemedicine, and other such “distance” mediated activities, even a class conducted via Blackboard!  This frees up opportunity to interact, allows organized society to connect in greater and newer ways, and world-wide associations are brought together at one time thereby allowing many different historical trends to converge into a new reality.

 

Disembedded Systems.  Upon this concept of time and space is constructed the concept of disembedding of social systems.  Two types of disembedded systems are proposed: symbolic tokens (things for exchange) and expert systems (ways to organize social environments or large amount of material).  Giddens uses money as the example of the symbolic tokens process.  Money has been taken out of the local realm of negotiation and exchanged purchase.  Now money is more than simply a check or even a credit card.  The Concept of money that allows an otherwise exchange of perhaps unrelated items or services may only be a “digital string of numbers”.  The medium of exchange once recognized “currency” (commodity money or bank money) is no longer needed in order to allow people to consummate a transaction.  Now those who may never meet, nor physically exchange currency may come together in hyper-text and consummate a deal or purchase a product on e-bay (money proper).

 

Money is one example, but the crux of the thought is that for the disembedded mechanism to function there must be trust and faith (a type) within the institutions of modern society.  Institutions are of course “abstract” social concepts that assist society to flow and function properly.

 

Expert systems are ways to organize and manage.  Expert knowledge is integrated into the society so that it is continuous and ever present (27).  Examples are OSHA safety rules, Housing Inspections, Building Codes, Judicial System, Utility Companies, the transportation system, communications system, our pay check, insurance, and other daily services and regulations we normally do not think of each day of our lives.  We have faith that these things exist and will assist our lives.  In other wise we respect a concept of “authority” or superior construct that makes sure our world turns each day.  We accept and rely on this social order although we never perhaps are able to actually define the processes.

 

Trust.  Faith leads to trust and trust bridges the gap to confidence.  Trust is associated with absence of space and time.  There is a definitive definition of trust at page 34.  Trust and risk are associated.

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[1] Giddens, Anthony. 1990.  “The Contours of High Modernity.” Pps. 1-34 in The Consequences of Modernity.  Cambridge: Polity